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The purpose of this work is to scrutinize the legal structure of trusts in Taiwan, 
Japan and South Korea. The so-called infrastructure of the private law of them is 
rooted in the Roman-Germanic basis, which adopts dichotomous system in respect 
of the private law dealing with property: the law of property and that of obligation. 
However, the adoption of the trust has caused some problems. Though controversial, 
the contract-based view seems to be the majority thesis in the East Asian civil 
jurisdictions, yet the property-based view dominates the common law world 
nowadays. However, being influenced by common law, the property-approach is also 
asserted in the aforementioned jurisdictions. It should be noted there has been 
another approach normally adopted by some civil jurisdictions and mixed 
jurisdictions, i.e. the doctrine of separate patrimony. The East Asian civil 
jurisdictions’ approach is somehow at a crossroads. Being a legal system where 
nomenclature matters, the issue of taxonomic classification can hardly be ignored. 
We must find a way out from the crossroads, either perfect or not. It is to this task to 
which the present work is devoted. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
The purpose of this work is to scrutinize the legal structure of trusts in 
East Asia. Here, East Asian jurisdictions are used to encompass Taiwan, 
Japan and South Korea. The Civil Code and the Trust Act of each of these 
jurisdictions share remarkable resemblance owing to the regional history. 
For this reason, at least in terms of theoretical analysis, it would presumably 
be justified to put them together under the umbrella of East Asia.1 The trust 
law of East Asian jurisdictions has experienced seemingly insurmountable 
doctrinal obstacles ever since the first importer, i.e. Japan introduced and 
promulgated it in 1922, followed by South Korea in 1961 and Taiwan in 
1996. The main reason is possibly grounded on the fact that the so-called 
infrastructure of the private law of them is rooted in the Roman-Germanic 
basis, which adopts dichotomous system in respect of the private law dealing 
with property: the law of property and that of obligation. However, the 
adoption of the trust has caused an issue: which pigeon-hole should we 
wedge it into? We have two options: it is either contract or property. Though 
controversial, the former view seems to be the majority thesis in East Asia, 
yet the latter dominates the common law world nowadays. However, being 
influenced by common law, the property-approach is also asserted in East 
Asia. The truth is that there has been another approach normally adopted by 
some civil jurisdictions and mixed jurisdictions: the doctrine of separate 
patrimony. Unfortunately, there has been surprisingly little attention that has 
been given to it in East Asia.  
Some may argue the debate does not hold any practical importance, thus 
we do not need to squeeze it into either category, for trusts are genetically 
impossible to be reconciled with the civilian tradition. The problem is that 
trusts are already transplanted on the East Asian civilian soil. Being a legal 
system where nomenclature matters, the issue of taxonomic classification 
can hardly be ignored. We must find a way out from this crossroads, either 
perfect or not. The rules embedded in the civil code and those mechanisms 
of trusts enshrined in the Trust Act will guide us to the path we need to 
consider in the future. In the following, we will examine whether trusts are 
contracts, followed by the possibility of property approach. Finally, we will 
explore the doctrine of separate patrimony. 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
 1. For reasons of space and the present author’s lack of knowledge over the trust law of other East 
Asian civil jurisdictions, the trust law of them will not be included in this work. Furthermore, the work 
fails to deal with all the issues given by the reviewers, for some of them need exploring in a separate 
work. However, the present author is very grateful for their comments, and, needless to say, I bear sole 
responsibility for the views presented in this work. 
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II. TRUSTS AS CONTRACTS 
 
A.  Introduction 
 
‘Trust Contract’ is not an expression familiar to common law lawyers, 
yet the term is often used by Taiwanese, Korean, and Japanese lawyers. In 
common law jurisdictions, the law of contract and the law of trusts are two 
different subjects, treated as distinct species, and so the compound 
expression ‘trust contract’ is confusing. It seems hardly more 
comprehensible than ‘cat dog’ or ‘bird fish’. However, in East Asian 
Jurisdictions , trust relationships have been recognised as a species of 
contractual relationship, and as a result, ‘trust contract’ denotes a regime of 
obligations between the parties to the contract, and is regarded as simply one 
more name on the list of types of contracts; alongside hire, transportation, 
mandate, sale and so on. So, the term ‘trust contract’ does not sound like ‘cat 
dog’ or ‘bird fish’; instead, it sounds like a kind of dog or a kind of fish. The 
question that needs to be explored here is whether the law of trusts can be 
subsumed as a sub-category of the law of contract. If it is proved that it can, 
the term ‘trust contract’ can survive, viz., the trust can continue to be 
regarded as a contractual relationship. If not, East Asian lawyers may have 
to divorce the two terms, adjust their usage of terminology, and reconsider 
the pure contractual approach to trusts. The key issue, accordingly, is to 
identify the source(s) of any discrepancy between a contractual relationship 
and an express trust relationship. In doing so, it is necessary to determine the 
indicia of each relationship. The indicia scrutinised in this chapter are the 
elements involved in the formation of contract and trust relationships, the 
obligations imposed by those relationships, and the remedies available to 
protect those relationships. When these indicia have been investigated, it 
ought to be clear whether trusts are contracts. We will begin with the 
inaugural step in each relationship, i.e., formation. This is followed by the 
remedial aspect, viz., the remedies available should the promisor or trustee 
defaults on his duties. Fiduciary duties, which are often described as the 
hallmark of the trustee, are discussed when addressing the remedial aspect 
because, as will be seen below, fiduciary duties and the effects of breaches 
of such duties are closely connected; and because, more importantly, the 
extent to which fiduciary duties distinguish trust relationships from 
contractual relationships cannot be fully evaluated if they are to be explored 
separately.   
 
B.  Trusts Are Contracts: A Doubtful Position 
 
In the trust law of Taiwan, South Korea and Japan, no formality is 
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required in establishing a valid express trust over personalty and realty 
unless an express trust is established by means of will or self-declaration.2 
This section proceeds on the assumption that these formal requirements are 
all satisfied, and enquires into the following more substantive questions: 
whether manifestation(s) of intention to create a trust (i.e., of the settlor’s 
intention to create a trust and the trustee’s acceptance of the trusteeship) can 
be the foundation of the contractual approach.  
 
1.  Manifestation of Intention(s)  
 
(a) When settlor is not a trustee   
Suppose S transfers a right to T and asks T to hold that right on trust for 
B, or for S himself. The central issue in such cases is as follows: can the 
legal relationship between S and T count as a contractual relationship? The 
answer in common law jurisdictions, where contract law is stringently 
differentiated from trusts law (being partly governed by a proprietary 
regime) is almost always negative, since it is S’s intention to form a trust 
relationship, rather than a contractual relationship. But, if the question were 
posed in Taiwan, South Korea and Japan, it would be understood in terms of 
whether the relationship between S and T was a trust contract or another type 
of contract. This can be attributed to Taiwanese, Korean, and Japanese 
lawyers’ perception of the consent manifested by settlor and trustee as a 
contractually binding agreement, i.e., a deal between them. Indeed, it can 
scarcely be denied that there must have been a negotiation between S and T, 
for we cannot forcibly vest a right in T and impose obligations upon him 
despite his opposition. As a result of this orthodoxy, the expression ‘trust 
contract’ is taken for granted in these jurisdictions. Thus, we need to discuss 
whether the existence of bilateral consent can justify a contractual approach 
to trusts.    
It has just been said that there is no denying that the express trust 
established between S and T are hardly different from a contractual 
relationship in terms of the existence of bilateral intentions. However, we 
should question whether it is right to conclude from the existence of mutual 
agreement that an express trust is a contractual relationship. The work argues 
that the conclusion currently drawn by East Asian orthodoxy is inaccurate 
because mutual consent is equally significant in the acquisition of 
proprietary rights. Although sometimes proprietary rights (such as 
ownership, security interests, and so on) can be acquired by operation of law, 
                                                                                                                            
 2. Shintakuho (信託法) [Trust Act] 2011, art. 3, no. 3 (Japan); Sintakbeop (신탁법률) [Trust 
Act], Act. no. 10924, 25 July, 2011, art. 3, para. 1, no. 3 (S. Kor.); Shen Tuo Fa (信託法) [Trust Act] 
1996, art. 71, para. 1 (Taiwan).  
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mutual consent is in the majority of cases an element indispensible to the 
process of acquisition. For example, if a lender wants to secure the debt 
owed by his debtor by having a security interest attached to the borrower’s 
title to the car, this can only be realized if the debtor agrees to his lender’s 
request. Should we regard this sort of agreement as a contractual relationship 
just because of the existence of the bilateral intentions manifested by the 
lender and debtor in the process of establishing a security right over the 
debtor’s title to the car? (Indeed, the lender’s security interest over the 
debtor’s title to the car would not have been successful were it not for the 
deal made between them.) The answer is ‘No’. Deals can involve not only 
the grant of a contractual right but also the grant of a proprietary right, so it 
would be premature to conclude that express trusts, where settlor and trustee 
are not identical persons, are, therefore, a contract-based relationship. Other 
possibilities remain; we just cannot tell whether the relationship is a 
‘contractual’ one simply from the existence of mutual agreement in the 
formation of the legal relationship. The key issues are: (1) what type of legal 
relationship the parties intend to establish; and (2) what effects the legal 
system imposes on the intended relationship.        
As a result, if trusts always require that the settlor’s rights be settled in 
another person, trusts and contracts are virtually indistinguishable at least as 
regards the existence of mutual consent. However, we have also seen that the 
need for mutual consent does not demand a contract-based analysis of trusts, 
even though the express trusts mentioned in this section are established by 
the bilateral intentions of S and T. The presence of mutual consent does not 
confirm which regime the express trusts considered in this section (i.e., 
where the settlor is not the trustee) fall within. It could be a contractual 
regime or a proprietary regime, or a third type of mechanism (e.g., an 
intention to create a separate fund). Furthermore, in cases in which a settlor 
intends to declare a trust by will, the trustee appointed in that testamentary 
trust would have no one to contract with, because a will only become 
effective after the testator/settlor deceases. If then nature of the trust is 
contract, it seems virtually impossible to explain the nature of the trust 
created by the settlor’s will, for there has never been a contract whatsoever. 
Thus, the position currently held by the trust law of Taiwan, Japan, and 
Korea is doubtful. 
(b) When settlor is a trustee   
In the foregoing section, it was found that consensual agreement itself 
between settlor and trustee does not validate the view that express trusts are 
contractual relationships. The contractual approach is founded upon the 
premise that the settlor is not also the (or a) trustee. This premise meets a 
huge obstacle when we find that an express trust can also be set up by the 
settlor’s unilateral intention to create a trust for others: i.e., by a 
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self-declaration of trust. The trust law of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan 
accepts the establishment of a trust by self-declaration of trust.3 The reason 
this makes us hesitate to assimilate trusts with contracts lies in the 
impossibility of entering into a contract with oneself. 4  For example, 
consider the position if S declares himself a trustee of his car for B. 
According to the contractual approach, the deal should be concluded 
between settlor and trustee. However, in this case, S is both settlor and 
trustee, and it is hard to find a mutual agreement on establishing a trust, or 
consent between two parties to the establishment of a trust. In addition, 
while S can declare himself trustee of his car for himself and B, he cannot 
establish the same legal relationship under the contractual approach, for a 
person cannot conclude a contract with himself and make himself benefit 
from his own assets. Thus, the most basic elements of the contractual 
approach to trusts seem incapable of surviving in jurisdictions where trusts 
can be created by self-declaration.      
(c) Trusts as a transcending device   
If the trust can be established by virtue of contract, will, and 
self-declaration, it implies that there is a special quality embedded in the 
trust mechanism that transcends these three methods; for, if the trust was 
based on the contractual regime, it would be virtually impossible to set it up 
by the latter two methods, which do not involve any consensual agreement 
but only an unilateral intention to create a trust. This proves that the trust law 
of Taiwan, Japan and Korea impliedly or indirectly treats the express trust as 
being a different species from contract. Moreover, contract alone does not 
produce some of the remedies that will be discussed below. Thus, we cannot 
align contract with trust. It would be best to interpret the current language, 
‘trust contract’ as denoting ‘consensual trust’ rather than ‘contractual trust’. 
 
2.  The Nature of Trustee’s Liability in Breach of Trust 
 
Another problem that somehow makes us hesitate to fully regard trusts 
as contracts lies in the nature of the trustee’s liability in breach of trust. In 
the above section, we have seen that trusts can be created by virtue of 
settlor’s manifestation of intent, will and self-declaration. Let us suppose S 
                                                                                                                            
 3. Id.  
 4. (フィデュシャリ 「ー信認」の時代：信託と契約) Rye v. Rye A.C. 496 (1962). This issue had 
already been pointed out in Japan that the contractual approach should not overlook the explanation of 
self-declaration of trust, see HIGUCHI NORIO, FIDYUSHARI SHINNIN NO JIDAI: SINTAKU TO KEIYAKU 
(フィデュシャリ 「ー信認」の時代：信託と契約) [FIDUCIARY RELATIONS–TRUSTS AND CONTRACT] 
116 (1999). This issue has been pointed out in England by Professor Paul Mattews, From Obligation 
to Property, and Back Again?, in EXTENDING THE BOUNDARIES OF TRUSTS AND SIMILAR 
RING-FENCED FUNDS 203 (David Hayton ed., 2002); this can also be applied in Japan, South Korea, 
and Taiwan. 
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has created a trust for B and the trustee is T; T then breaches of his duty of 
care and causes damage to the trust fund. If this trust is a contractual 
relationship, the nature of T’s liability must be contractual liability. What if 
S has created the trust by means of will or self-declaration, and T breaches 
the same duty of care and some damage occurs to the trust fund. Since there 
is no contract in this case, it is so obvious that the nature of T’s liability 
cannot be regarded as contractual liability. Both cases are concerned with 
the trust and the duty breached by the trustees is identical; there just seems 
lack of justification(s) that can support the above contradiction. If they fall 
within the cases of trust, then the nature of the trustee’s liability in each 
scenario must be consistent, for like cases should be treated alike. As long as 
we don’t give up the idea that trusts can be created by way of will and 
self-declaration, it seems that the contractual approach is the one that must 
be revisited. 
 
3.  The Trustee’s Fiduciary Obligations and Breach of Fiduciary 
Obligations   
 
Once the trust relationship is established, the trustee is burdened with 
fiduciary obligations to his beneficiary. This section considers whether the 
trustee’s fiduciary duties can be recognised as one of the indicia 
distinguishing trusts from contracts. It is often argued in common law 
jurisdictions that the fiduciary nature of a trustee’s obligations distinguishes 
them from contractual obligations; and hence that trusts are not contracts.5 
But, this traditional approach has attracted criticism from certain common 
law lawyers, who base their arguments on the default nature of fiduciary 
duties or the law and economics approach.6 This kind of debate (i.e., 
whether fiduciary duties make the law of trusts different from contract law) 
has received surprisingly little academic or judicial attention in Taiwan, 
Japan, and Korea, as a corollary of this, fiduciary duties have seldom been 
used as a criterion for distinguishing express trust relationships from other 
contractual relationships.7 So, this section will first discuss the contents of 
the fiduciary duties. Second, we will look into the remedies available against 
a trustee when he, in breach of fiduciary duty, procures certain profits when 
                                                                                                                            
 5. Canson Enterprises Ltd. v. Broughton & Co. 85 D.L.R 129 at 154 (4th Can. B.C. 1991); Tamar 
Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REV. 1209 (1995); MATTEW CONAGLEN, 
FIDUCIARY LOYALTY: PROTECTING THE DUE PERFORMANCE OF NON-FIDUCIARY DUTIES 214 (2010); 
Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. REV. 595 (1997). 
 6. John Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625 (1995); Frank 
E. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425 (1993); Henry 
Butler & Larry Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 
WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990); Robert Cooter & Bradly Friedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its 
Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045 (1991). 
 7. NORIO, supra note 4, at 30. 
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carrying out trust business. The analysis may lead Taiwanese, Japanese, and 
Korean lawyers to revisit their current tendency to treat the fiduciary duties 
owed by trustees (and other fiduciaries) as a class of contractual obligations.  
(a) Fiduciary obligations   
A distinguished Canadian lawyer, Professor Lionel Smith, once said: 
“civil tradition lacks the historical foundations that underpin the fiduciary 
obligations known to the common law”.8 This is also true to Taiwan, Japan, 
and Korea. Thus, it merits exploration and two questions arise: (1) what is 
the content of the fiduciary duty, and (2) what normative behaviour could 
possibly demarcate fiduciary obligations from contractual obligations?   
(i) The duty of loyalty   
A fiduciary duty, though controversial, also expressed as a ‘duty of 
loyalty’,9 is concerned with the ‘undivided loyalty’ of the person who stands 
in a fiduciary position.10 The duty is considered as the defining obligation of 
a fiduciary.11 Two rules can be identified here: The first is the no-conflict 
rule; the second, the no-profit rule.12 The no-conflict rule denotes that “no 
one, having such (fiduciary) duties to discharge, shall be allowed to enter 
into engagements in which he has, or can have, a personal interest 
conflicting, or which possibly may conflict, with the interests of those whom 
he is bound to protect”.13 The no-profit rule means that the trustee, as a 
fiduciary, is required not to procure or pursue any profit or interest of his 
own in performing his trust business.14 These two rules are generally 
accepted as the core constituent elements of fiduciary obligations.15  
                                                                                                                            
 8. Lionel D. Smith, The Motive, Not the Deed, in RATIONALIZING PROPERTY, EQUITY AND 
TRUSTS: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF EDWARD BURN 54 (Joshua Getzler ed., 2003). 
 9. A-G v. Blake, 1 A.C. 268 (H.L. 2001); Coulthard v. Disco Mix Club Ltd, 1 W.L.R. 707 (Eng. 
2000); Peter Birks, The Content of Fiduciary Obligation, 34 ISRAEL L. REV. 3 (2000). 
 10. Boulting v. Association of Cinematograph Television and Allied Technician, 2 Q.B. 606 at 
636 (Eng. 1963). 
 11. Bristol & West Building Society v. Mothew, Ch.118 (Eng. 1998). 
 12. Some authorities suggest that the no-profit rule is no more than an illustration of the 
no-conflict rule e.g., New Zealand Netherlands Society ‘Orange’ Inc. v. Kuys, 1W.L.R. 1126 at 1129 
(Eng. 1973); Conway v. Ratiu, EWCA (Civ 2005) 1302, [59], 1 All E.R. 571 (Eng. 2006). However, 
other authorities suggest that they are distinct rules (e.g., Brown v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, 
A.C. 244 (H.L. 1965); Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver, 2 A.C. 134 (H.L. 1967).     
 13. Aberdeen Rly v. Blaikie Bros. 1 Macq. 461(H.L. 1854) 471 (Lord Cranworth L.C.) (U.K.).  
 14. Keech v. Sandford, EWHC (Ch) J76, [1558-1774] All E.R. Rep. 230 (Eng. 1726); Bray v. 
Ford, A.C. 44 (H.L. 1896) 51; the no-profit rule normally comes into play when a trustee secretly 
pursues his own profits with the trust funds, but in rare cases this is not so: for example, when 
someone who has ceased to be a trustee acquires some profits by using the information he procures 
while he was acting as a trustee, see William Swadling, Property: General Principles, in ENGLISH 
PRIVATE LAW 219, 298-99 (Andrew Burrows ed., 2d ed. 2008). 
 15. PAUL FINN, FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS 199-200 (1977); Leonard S. Sealy, Some Principles of 
Fiduciary Obligation, 21 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 119 (1963); RODERICK PITT MEAGHER, JOHN DYSON 
HEYDON & MARK JAMES LEEMING, MEAGHER, GUMMOW & LEHANE’S EQUITY DOCTRINES & 
REMEDIES 169 (4th ed., 2002); However, some commentator lists three distinct kinds of fiduciary 
duty: e.g., duty of loyalty, duty of influence, and duty of confidence, see Peter Millett, Equity’s Place 
in the Law of Commerce, 114 LAW Q. REV. 214, 219 (1998). 
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Both the no-conflict and the no-profit rules are provided for in the Trust 
Act of each of Taiwan, Japan and South Korea.16 As in English law, they 
form the heart of the fiduciary duty of the trustee.17 First, the no-conflict 
rule requires that the trustee shall perform the duty of loyalty when carrying 
out the trust business; in other words, the duty requires trustees to manage 
the trust rights solely for the interests of the beneficiary, not for themselves 
or for others: trustees must act in the interests of their beneficiaries if any 
conflict of interests should arise. Secondly, the no-profit rule, by compelling 
the trustee to disgorge the profits he procures from any breach of his duty of 
loyalty, imposes a negative duty on the trustee, requiring him not to seek 
personal profit when managing the trust rights.    
(ii) Fiduciary and contractual obligations   
In the preceding paragraphs, it was found that the duty of loyalty 
consists of no-conflict and no profit rules. The issue here is whether these 
fiduciary obligations owed by the trustee can be described as unique when 
compared to obligations arising from contractual relationships; if so, the 
former will be demonstrably incapable of falling within the ambit of the 
latter. A successful answer to this question can probably be reached by 
exploring the distinct normative behaviour of fiduciary obligations, by 
comparison to contractual obligations. Some may think that fiduciary and 
contractual obligations are not different in that both regimes are designed to 
require one party to a relationship personally to perform an action or 
inaction.18 However, the point here is not to deny the obligational aspect of 
the trustee’s fiduciary duty. It is rather to focus on the question whether it is 
correct to bring fiduciary obligations within the scope of ‘contractual’ 
obligations. To know the normative function of a legal regime is meaningful 
because it helps to distinguish one area from the other. Therefore, the 
question that should be stressed here is, what is the normative function of 
fiduciary obligations? And, does it differ from that of contractual 
obligations?   
The trustee’s fiduciary obligation is commonly regarded as peculiarly 
intense compared to other obligations.19 This is partly due to the different 
                                                                                                                            
 16. Shintakuho [Trust Act] 2006, arts. 31, 40 para. 3 (Japan); Sintagbeop [Trust Act], Act. no. 
10924, 25 July, 2011, arts. 33, 34 (S. Kor.); Xintuofa [Trust Act] 1996, art. 35 (Taiwan). 
 17. ARAI MACOTO, SINTAKUHO (信託法) [THE LAW OF TRUST] 249 (3d ed. 2008).  
 18. While contractual relationships can involve personal duties of action or inaction, the no-conflict 
and no-profit rules are normally described in the form of “not-to-do-something”, and so require the 
fiduciary’s inaction. However, some academics stress the positive aspect of fiduciary duty, and argue 
that a fiduciary duty is a positive duty to advance the interests of the beneficiary, see Andrew Burrows, 
We Do This at Common Law but that in Equity, 22 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 8-9 (2002); the text 
that corresponds to this footnote includes the term ‘action’ so as not to exclude the positive aspect of 
fiduciary duty.   
 19. Austin Wakeman Scott, The Trustee’s Duty of Loyalty, 49 HARV. L. REV. 521 (1936); 
TERAMOTO SHINTO, KAISETSU SHIN SHINTAKUHO (カイセツ シン シンタクホ) [COMMENTARIES 
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foundations of fiduciary obligation and contractual obligation. In other 
words, differently to a contractual regime, a trustee is required to put the 
interest of the person he owes fiduciary duties ahead of himself. This rather 
draconian rule was also emphasised by Chief Justice Cardozo as follows: 
“Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at 
arm’s length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held 
to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, 
but the punctilio of an honour the most sensitive is then the standard of 
behaviour.”20 From this common law judges’ remarks, we can find a quite 
different normative behaviour of fiduciary obligations compared to 
contractual obligations: the former requires the trustee to act strictly in the 
best interests of the person (i.e., his beneficiary) to whom he owes the 
fiduciary obligations,21 whilst the latter are normally concerned with people 
pursuing their own interests; a party to the contract is not required to 
implement his obligations solely for the benefit of other party. So for 
example, even if I have entered into a contract with B to sell my laptop to 
him, I can still profit by selling my laptop to someone who offers me a better 
price which is high enough to cover the compensation I will owe to B for 
breaching my contract with him. In this contractual relationship, I have 
pursued my own interest through the breach of contract; this is quite 
possible. However, as a trustee, my fiduciary obligations, applying the 
prophylactic no-conflict rule that requires me not to put oneself in a position 
where my interests conflict with those of my beneficiary, simply forbids me 
even to negotiate with others if the deal in question presupposes the 
advancement of my own interests.22 And, moreover, if I breach my fiduciary 
duty and acquire personal benefits, the draconian remedy (i.e., the no profit 
rule) for this breach of fiduciary duty has me stripped of any benefits I have 
obtained.23 In other words, trusts law, by imposing upon the trustee the 
prophylactic rule of fiduciary loyalty comprising no-conflict and no-profit 
rules, 24  promotes or secures the advancement of the interests of the 
                                                                                                                            
ON THE NEW TRUSTS LAW] 68 (2007). 
 20. Meinhard v. Salmon 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928). 
 21. This is also the attitude taken by American Restatement (second) of Trusts s. 170 (1) (1959) 
(“The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary to administer the trust solely in the interest of the 
beneficiary.”). 
 22. In this respect, the present author agrees with Professor Lionel Smith who argues that “the 
heart of the fiduciary obligation lies in the justifiability of motive. Inaction, or action, may be a breach 
of fiduciary obligation, but not because there was a duty to act, or not to act; rather, because the 
inaction or action was improperly motivated”, see Smith, supra note 8, at 53, 64.  
 23. The question of profit stripping is discussed in the following section. 
 24. However, it has been argued that “the overarching conflict principle, designed to foster 
loyalty by discouraging any preference for personal interest over duty, extends only to circumstances 
where a trustee has placed himself in the position of conflict; it does not apply where the trustee has 
been placed in that position, whether expressly or by necessary implication from the circumstances, by 
the settlor” see Edwin Simpson, Conflicts, in BREACH OF TRUST 75, 94 (Peter Birks & Arianna Pretto 
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beneficiary.25 And this kind of normative behaviour (subjecting one party to 
the sole interest of another), which is embedded in the fiduciary duty of 
loyalty, can be said to be one of the distinct aspects of fiduciary obligations 
that does not form part of the normative basis of contractual relationships.26     
Some academics (particularly, law and economics theorists) in common 
law jurisdictions consider fiduciary duties as default rules (i.e., implied 
contract terms) that function as a gap-filling device, which perfects an 
otherwise-incomplete contract; on this view, fiduciary duties save the cost 
which would otherwise be incurred were the parties to the fiduciary 
relationship required to negotiate over the terms of a duty of loyalty.27 The 
central point of this approach is that fiduciary loyalty, being a default rule, 
can be contracted out of by the consent of settlor or beneficiary; and 
resembles in this respect other contractual relationships in which the parties 
are free to alter the terms of their contract. However, it has been argued that 
the fact that the trustee’s fiduciary duties can be relaxed by agreement does 
not compel the conclusion that fiduciary obligations are identical to 
contractual obligations; the process of altering the terms of fiduciary and 
contractual obligations is dissimilar. 28  Indeed, both common law 
jurisdictions and the Trust Act of each of Taiwan, Japan, and Korea afford 
the possibility of a fiduciary opting out of his fiduciary duties, either by the 
trust instrument29 or by the consent of the fiduciary’s principal,30 but the 
requirements are more stringent. For example, in common law jurisdictions, 
in order to avoid the liability that arises from a breach of fiduciary duty, the 
                                                                                                                            
eds., 2002). 
 25. Burrows, supra note 18, at 1, 8-9. 
 26. It may be thought that contracts too can result in a relationship in which one party is subjected 
to another; provided only that the parties agreed to that kind of relationship. However, the issue here is 
slightly different. In every express trust, someone who accepts the office of trusteeship automatically 
owes duties of fiduciary loyalty (unless there is agreement to the contrary; but, as will soon be 
revealed, there are some limits to the possibility of excluding the trustee’s fiduciary obligations); on 
the contrary, contractual relationships generally do not presuppose these draconian duties, which 
subjecting one party to the other.   
 27. Langbein, supra note 6, at 625, 655; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 425; Butler & 
Ribstein, supra note 6, at 1; Cooter & Friedman, supra note 6, at 1045; Anthony Duggan, Is Equity 
Efficient?, 113 L.Q. REV. 601, 624 (1997); Gillian Hadfield, An Incomplete Contracting Perspective 
on Fiduciary Duty, 28 CAN. BUS. L.J. 141-54 (1997). 
 28. Frankel, supra note 5, at 1209, 1211; CONAGLEN, supra note 5, at 219; Brudney, supra note 
5, at 595, 597 (1997). 
 29. Sargeant v. National Westminster Bank plc., 61 P. & C.R. 518 (Eng. 1991); Sintakuho [Trust 
Act] 2006, art. 31, para. 2, no. 1 (Japan); Sintakbeop [Trust Act], Act. no. 10924, 25 July, 2011, art. 34, 
para. 2, no. 1 (S. Kor.); Xintuofa [Trust Act] 1996, art. 27 (Taiwan) prescribe that the trustee can put 
himself in a conflict of interest situation if the trust instrument so allows; Restatement (Second) of 
Trusts s. 170(1) comment.  
 30. Gibson v. Jeyes, 6 Ves 266, 270-77 (1801); Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver, 2 A.C. 134, 153 
(1967); Quarter Master UK Ltd. v. Pyke EWHC (Ch) 1815, 1 B.C.L.C. 245 (Eng. 2004); Sintakuho 
[Trust Act] 2006, art. 31, para. 2, no. 2 (Japan); Sintakbeop [Trust Act], Act. no. 10924, 25 July, 2011, 
art. 34, para. 2, no. 2 (S. Kor.); Xintuofa [Trust Act] 1996, art. 35, para. 1, no. 1 (Taiwan) prescribes 
that the trustee can put himself in a conflict of interest situation if the beneficiary so authorises. 
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trustee’s authorisation must be acquired on the basis that he has disclosed all 
material facts31 that would otherwise affect the authorisation; and further, 
that authorisation must be supported by a clear evidence.32 In other words, 
only by a fully-informed and evidenced authorisation could a fiduciary be 
immune to liability for a breach of fiduciary duty. The common-law of 
contract, by contrast, does not tend to impose such cumbersome conditions 
upon the parties to a contract.33 Thus, the general rule is that “a person who 
is about to enter into a contract is under no duty to disclose material facts 
know to him but not to the other party34. . .if a general duty of disclosure did 
exist it would be very hard to say exactly what must be disclosed in any 
particular case.”35 Therefore, the non-disclosure of material facts may not, 
as a general rule, affect the validity of a contract;36 yet, by contrast, it 
always endangers the validity of any authorisation given to a trustee. What 
Japanese trusts law on this question of authorisation issue shows is even 
more draconian than the position at common law. As mentioned in the 
preceding paragraph, the trustee’s fiduciary duty can equally be exempted 
through approval given by the trust instrument or by the beneficiary. 
However, as at common law, this authorisation is taken to have been given 
on the condition that the fiduciary has informed the beneficiary of any 
material information.37 On top of this fully-informed consent rule there is 
one further limitation directed at fiduciaries who are trust companies. The 
Trust Enterprise Act of Taiwan and the Trust Business Act of Japan both 
require that authorisation for such companies must be given in a written 
document;38 and, some East Asian jurisdiction provides that, even if such 
authorisation is issued, it may not be effective if the transactions authorised 
could have a harmful impact on the beneficiary’s interests.39 Last but not 
least, while there is no provision to this effect, commentators tend to agree 
that any total or comprehensive elimination of fiduciary duties by means of 
                                                                                                                            
 31. New Zealand Netherlands Society ‘Orange’ Inc. v. Kuys, 1 W.L.R. 1126 (P.C. 1973) 1132 
(U.K.). 
 32. York & North-North-Midland Railway Co. v. Hudson, 51 E.R. 866 (1845); Coles v. Trecothick 
32 E.R. 592 (1804). 
 33. MICHAEL FURMSTON, CHESHIRE, FIFOOT & FURMSTON’S LAW OF CONTRACT 335 (15th ed., 
2007); JACK BEATSON, ANSON’S LAW OF CONTRACT 236 (28th ed., 2002). 
 34. Norwich Union Life Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Qureshi, 2 All E.R. (Comm) 707, 717 (1999). 
 35. EDWIN PEEL, TREITEL’S LAW OF CONTRACT 424 (12th ed., 2007). 
 36. Norwich Union Life Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Qureshi, supra note 34; Agnew v. Länsförsäkringsbolagens 
AB, 1 A.C. 223, 265 (2001). 
 37. Sintakuho [Trust Act] 2006, art. 31, para. 2, no. 2 (Japan); Sintakbeop [Trust Act], Act. no. 
10924, 25 July, 2011, art. 34, para. 2, no. 2 (S. Kor.); Xintuofa [Trust Act] 1996, art. 35, para. 1, no. 1 
(Taiwan). Though the word “material information” is not expressed in the Xintuofa [Trust Act] 1996, 
art. 35, para. 1, no. 1 (Taiwan), the result must be the same, for consent is meaningless without any 
material information being informed of.  
 38. Xintuoyefa (信託業法) [Trust Enterprise Act] 2000, art. 27, art. 29, para. 2 (Taiwan). 
 39. Xintuoyefa (信託業法) [Trust Enterprise Act] 2000, art. 29, para. 2 (Taiwan). 
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the trust instrument or mutual agreement would make the trust void, on the 
basis that by taking out the core elements of the trust, the parties to the trust 
are to be deemed to have had no intention to establish any fiduciary 
relationships whatsoever.40    
As has been explored, fiduciary duties have their distinct normative 
qualities in that trustees are from the beginning under demanding obligations 
to perform their duties solely in the best interests of their beneficiary, and 
that is not part of the general prerequisites to a contractual relationship. And 
while some endeavours have been made to justify the assertion that fiduciary 
obligations are identical to contractual obligations using the theory of the 
gap-filling default rule, the exacting process by which consent or 
authorisation to the exclusion of fiduciary duties must be procured clearly 
show the law’s determination to give consent a different role from that 
which it has in contractual relationships. And this is what the default-rule 
advocates have so far overlooked. Therefore, fiduciary obligations (i.e., the 
duty of loyalty) should be regarded as qualitatively different obligations 
from contractual obligations. 
(b) Breach of Fiduciary Duty: The Profit-Stripping Principle   
If a trustee procures any profits by using or receiving trust funds in 
breach of his fiduciary duty of loyalty, common law jurisdictions tend to 
regard those profits as being held on constructive trust for the beneficiaries 
of the trust.41 The approach adopted in East Asian Jurisdictions in this 
situation is to give the beneficiary a right to assert that the profits in the 
hands of his trustee form part of the trust funds, meaning that the beneficiary 
can order his trustee to put the unauthorised profits into the trust account, 
rather than leaving them in his personal account.42 Though the beneficiary 
can also ratify the fiduciary’s profit-acquiring transaction ex post facto,43 
profits obtained in breach of fiduciary obligations should in principle be 
returned even if they are not related to the trust funds or the principal’s 
assets. So, we have seen that the trustee/fiduciary’s profits acquired by virtue 
of a breach of fiduciary duty are generally liable to be returned. However, 
this powerful profit-stripping impulse in the case of breach of fiduciary 
obligations is fundamentally not the usual response to a breach of contractual 
obligations, 44  which is principally compensatory damage. 45 、 46  Thus, 
                                                                                                                            
 40. SHINTO, supra note 19, at 118, 119 n. 3.  
 41. Guinness plc. v. Saunders, 2 A.C. 663 (1990); Neptune (Vehicle Washing Equipment) Ltd. v. 
Fitzgerald, Ch. 274 (1996); CMS Dolphin Ltd. v. Simonet, 2 B.C.L.C. 704 (2001). 
 42. MACOTO, supra note 17, at 269; Sintakuho [Trust Act] 2006, art. 40, para. 3 (Japan); 
Sintakbeop [Trust Act], Act. no. 10924, 25 July, 2011, art. 43, para. 3 (S. Kor.); Xintuofa [Trust Act] 
1996, art. 35, para. 3 (Taiwan).  
 43. Eg. Sintakuho (信託法) [Trust Act] 2006, art. 32, para. 5 (Japan). 
 44. Minpo (民法) [Civil Code] 1898, art. 415 (Japan); Minbeop (민법) [Civil Code], Act. no. 
471, 1 Jan., 1960, art. 390 (S. Kor.); Minfa (民法) [Civil Code] 1929, art. 226 (Taiwan) provide that 
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whether by analysis of the obligations that exist or the remedies that are 
given, any equation of contractual obligations with fiduciary obligations 
should be viewed with care unless and until the (many) doctrinal issues set 
out in this section can be satisfactorily dissolved.     
 
4. Effects against Non-Parties to the Trust   
 
Probably one of the most distinctive characteristics distinguishing trusts 
from contracts is the trust’s effects against non-parties to the trust. 47 
Included in the category of non-parties to the trust are third party transferees 
and the trustee’s personal creditors. And it is admitted unequivocally that the 
protection of the trust fund against non-parties to the trust as the most 
important feature of the trust.48  
As to the effect against third party transferees, the Trust Act of each of 
Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea awards the beneficiary a right to rescind the 
transaction concluded between the trustee and the third party transferee,49 
and by which can a beneficiary recover the dissipated trust fund. Unlike 
Actio Pauliana (fraud on creditors) prescribed in the civil code of Taiwan, 
Japan and South Korea,50 the beneficiary’s right of rescission does not 
require that the trustee should prejudice the beneficiaries, and, moreover, the 
assets recovered from the third party can only be used for the beneficiaries of 
the trust, rather than for the trustee’s all creditors. Thus, the beneficiary’s 
right of rescission prescribed in the law of trust is different from the one 
provided for in the civil code of Taiwan, Japan and South Korea.51 It is quite 
                                                                                                                            
compensatory damages are the principal response to a breach of obligations. 
 45. Paul Finn, Contract and the Fiduciary Principle, 12 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 76, 83 (1989); 
Thus, Professor Paul Matthews also argues that the “common law rules of remoteness of damage, and 
at least some of the rules relating to causation of loss, do not apply in breach of trust claims”, see 
Mattews, supra note 4, at 203, 221. 
 46. An exception to the general principle in English law would be the case of Attorney-General v. 
Blake, 1 A.C. 268 (Eng. 2001), in which a profit-stripping remedy was awarded for a breach of 
contractual obligations. However, this remedy was said to be allowable “only in exceptional 
circumstances” (Attorney-General v. Blake, 1 A.C. 268, 285 (2001)). 
 47. This point is also raised and argued in some common law jurisdiction, please see Joshua 
Getzler, Legislative Incursions into Modern Trusts Doctrine in England: The Trustee Act 2000 and the 
Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, 2 GLOBAL JURIST TOPICS 1, 13 (2002). 
 48. MACOTO, supra note 17, at 103. 
 49. Sintakuho [Trust Act] 2006, art. 27 (Japan); Sintakbeop (신탁법) [Trust Act], Act. no. 10924, 
25 July, 2011, art. 75 (S. Kor.); Xintuofa [Trust Act] 1996, art. 18 (Taiwan).  
 50. Minpo [Civil Code] 1898, art. 424, 425 (Japan); Minbeop [Civil Code], Act. no. 471, 1 Jan., 
1960, art. 406 (S. Kor.); Minfa [Civil Code] 1929, art. 244 (Taiwan).  
 51. For more details on the beneficiary’s right to rescind, see Chu Peh-Sung (朱柏松), Lun 
Shoutojen Weifan Hsinto Penchieh Chufen Hsinto Tsaichan Chih Hsiaoli (論受託人違反信託本旨處
分信託財產之效力) [The Effectiveness of Dispositions in Breach of Trust by Trustees], 82 YUEDAN 
FAXUE ZAZHI (月旦法學雜誌) [TAIWAN L. REV.] 32 (2002); Wu Ying-Chieh, Shintakbeopsang 
Suikjaeui Chwisokwon (신탁법상 수익자의 취소권) [The Beneficiary's Right of Rescission], 38 
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hard to imagine a contractual mechanism could ever accord to one of the 
parties to it such a powerful right to recover the subject-matter of the 
contract. Trust allows the beneficiary to meddle with the transaction between 
his trustee and a third party with such generous requirements, which a 
contractual relationship cannot be expected to be capable of. 
As to the effect against the trustee’s personal creditors, the Trust Act of 
each of Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea provides that trust funds do not 
form part of the trustee’s personal assets should he become bankrupt.52 In 
other words, the beneficiary’s position is preferred than those personal 
creditors of the trustee. If trust is a contract, beneficiaries should be treated 
equally, but they are preferred in the trustee’s bankruptcy; the law impliedly 
prefers a trust to a contract, viz., they are different. 
To sum up, the third party-effect and the bankruptcy effect are not 
reconcilable with the contractual approach: trust can hardly be treated as a 
contract. 
 
5. Judicial Intervention   
 
Another distinctive feature of trusts compared to contracts would 
probably be the degree of judicial intervention. The Trust Act of each of 
Taiwan, Japan, and Korea does not have any articles dealing with the 
inherent jurisdiction of the court to give proper directions to the parties to a 
trust concerning the administration of a trust. However, it does provide that 
the beneficiary is entitled to make an application to the court to appoint an 
inspector to monitor the trustee’s administration of the trust.53 As regards 
the appointment or removal of the trustee, the courts do have jurisdiction to 
appoint a new trustee54 if the settlor or beneficiary cannot decide whom to 
appoint after the trustee dies, loses his legal capacity, becomes bankrupt and 
so on. Furthermore, courts are also, following the application of the parties 
to the trust, empowered to remove a trustee who has breached one of his 
duties; and can remove a trustee for other significant reasons not involving a 
breach of the trustee’s duties.55  
This section has only touched on the point that judicial intervention is 
normally permitted, such that the courts occupy a comparatively important 
                                                                                                                            
ANAMBEOPHAK (안암법학) [ANAM L. REV.] 199, 199-25 (2012). 
 52. Sintakuho [Trust Act] 2006, art. 23 (Japan); Sintakbeop [Trust Act], Act. no. 10924, 25 July, 
2011, art. 24 (S. Kor.); Xintuofa [Trust Act] 1996, art. 11 (Taiwan).  
 53. Sintakuho [Trust Act] 2006, art. 46 (Japan); Sintakbeop [Trust Act], Act. no. 10924, 25 July, 
2011, art. 67 (S. Kor.); Xintuofa [Trust Act] 1996, art. 52 (Taiwan). 
 54. Sintakuho [Trust Act] 2006, art. 62, para. 4 (Japan); Sintakbeop [Trust Act], Act. no. 10924, 
25 July, 2011, art. 21, para. 2 (S. Kor.); Xintuofa [Trust Act] 1996, art. 36, para. 3 (Taiwan). 
 55. Sintakuho [Trust Act] 2006, art. 58, para. 4 (Japan); Sintakbeop [Trust Act], Act. no. 10924, 
25 July, 2011, art. 16, para. 3 (S. Kor.); Xintuofa [Trust Act] 1996, art. 36, para. 2 (Taiwan). 
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role in facilitating the proper administration of trusts. Moreover, the 
functions performed by the courts in the appointment of trustees, 
administration of funds, and removal of trustees, are difficult to reconcile 
with the trust being a contractual relationship. Courts are generally not 
interested in whether there is an adequate counterparty to the contract; in 
removing a party from the contract; or in monitoring the performance of the 
counterparty to a privately-concluded contractual relationship. Thus, the role 
of judicial intervention should also indicate to us that private express trusts 
are qualitatively different from contracts.    
 
C. Conclusion 
 
Regarding a trust as a contract is similar to classifying a whale as a 
special fish. Whales do not produce their offspring in the form of eggs like 
other fish. Should we say that whales are a special species of fish and put 
them in the category of Pisces simply because of the similarity in their 
appearance? In the realm of analytical science, accurate nomenclature plays 
a vital role. What we should focus on are the decisive or core features 
demarcating one thing from another, not any superficial similarities. The 
facts that a trust can be created without mutual consent, that the beneficiary 
of a trust is capable of recovering his specific funds (as opposed to having a 
purely personal claim for money) from a recipient third party by exercising 
his right of rescission, and that judicial intervention is normally permitted, 
are sufficient to tell us that the mechanics of a trust are distinct from those of 
a contract: the proposition that trusts are contracts is probably founded on an 
unsound premise. 
 
III. TRUST AS PROPERTY 
 
A. Introduction 
 
If we conclude that the contractual approach is not to be taken, the next 
candidate to be explored must be property regime. This is so because the 
private law dealing with property in Taiwan, Japan, and Korea is divided 
into obligation and property, and the dichotomy requires us to examine 
whether it can be wedged into the latter pigeon hole. An examination on the 
property regime is a good source of comparative analysis since trusts law in 
common law jurisdictions is normally considered part of the law of property, 
for it creates a property right (or right in rem) for the benefit of the 
beneficiary of a trust. The question is thus as follows: whether it is possible 
to argue that the beneficiary in Taiwan, Japan, and Korea can also be said to 
have a proprietary interest over the trust funds. Therefore, the central issue 
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that needs exploring in this section should be the ‘the nature of the 
beneficiary’s right over trust funds’. In the following discussion, we will 
briefly examine the approach taken in some common law jurisdictions, since 
it helps us properly understand the propositions of a property-based system 
for the trust; and it will be disclosed that they cannot be supported in 
Taiwan, Japan, and Korea.  
  
B.  The Nature of the Beneficiary’s Right in Common Law Jurisdictions 
 
1.  A Property-Based System 
 
It is true that many distinguished lawyers56 and cases57 have explained 
the nature of the right of the beneficiary on the right in rem approach. For 
example, Professor Gardner identifies the beneficiary’s right as a kind of 
right in rem and says ‘. . . [T]rusts can be used to divide the ownership 
between two or more people.’58 The grounds for saying this are that the 
beneficiary’s right can be effective against a disponee 59  (third party 
transferee: the so-called ‘third-party effect’) and that his right can take 
priority over the trustee’s ordinary creditors if the trustee becomes bankrupt 
(the so-called ‘bankruptcy effect).60 Suppose a settlor transfers a right to a 
trustee requiring him to hold it under a trust for the benefit of a beneficiary. 
If the trustee in breach of the trust transfers the trust fund to a third party and 
the latter is not a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the breach, 
the third party disponee is bound by the beneficiary’s right. This is so for the 
beneficiary’s right is a property right. Moreover, when a right is held on 
trust, it allows the parties to the trust to partition off an insulated set of assets 
for separate treatment. As a result, when a trustee becomes insolvent, the 
trust rights do not vest in his or her trustee in bankruptcy (if the trustee is an 
individual) or company liquidator (if the trustee is a corporation). The 
consequence is that the trust funds cannot be used to satisfy the trustee’s own 
debts.61 This is provided for by the Insolvency Act 1986 (UK). Section 
283(1)(a) says that ‘all property belonging to or vested in the bankrupt at the 
                                                                                                                            
 56. Austin Wakeman Scott, The Nature of the Rights of the Cestui Que Trust, 17 COLUM. L. REV. 
269 (1917); CHARLES ANDREW HUSTON, THE ENFORCEMENT OF DECREES IN EQUITY 3, 87-154 
(1915); JOHN WILLIAM SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 277-78, 284-89 (7th ed. 1924). 
 57. Baker v. Archer-Shee, A.C. 844 (1927); Archer-Shee v. Garland, A.C. 212 (1931); IRC v. 
Berrill, 1 All E.R. 867 (1982). 
 58. SIMON GARDNER, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAND LAW 13 (2007); note that it is axiomatic that 
there is no common law ownership in English law, although this statement gives the impression that it 
presupposes the existence of common law ownership. 
 59. SIMON GARDNER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TRUSTS 248 (2d ed., 2003). 
 60. Id. at 248-49. 
 61. On the other hand, if the beneficiary becomes insolvent or bankrupt, the beneficial interest 
does vest in the beneficiary’s trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator.  
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commencement of the bankruptcy’ comprises a bankrupt’s estate; and 
section 283(3)(a) provides that section 283(1)(a) does not apply to ‘property 
held by the bankrupt on trust for any other person’.62 Article I (3)63 of the 
‘Principles of European Trust Law’ and article 11(b)64  of the ‘Hague 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition’ also 
provide for this effect in insolvency. Consequently, since the trust rights are 
kept separate from those used to satisfy the trustee’s personal debts, those 
rights are protected from the trustee’s own creditors. This bears a 
resemblance to the effect of property right rather than that of personal right, 
in that the effect of the right reaches a party other than the trustee. 
Accordingly, the property-right approach relies on the following two effects: 
the effect in insolvency and the aforementioned effect of the beneficiary’s 
right on third parties.  
  
2.  The Falsity of the Concept of ‘Division of Ownership’   
 
Though the beneficiary’s right is generally regarded as a property right 
in its nature in common law jurisdictions, it must not be taken for granted 
that the beneficiary’s right is a kind of ownership. It must be noted that that 
there are criticisms and counter arguments relating to the idea that trusts 
involve a division of ownership.65 For instance, Professor Tony Honoré 
said: “while trust beneficiaries undoubtedly possess a beneficial interest in 
trust assets there is no compelling reason, it seems to me, to describe this as 
a form of ownership.”66 An approach according to which the beneficiary’s 
property right is not ‘carved out’ of legal ownership, but ‘engrafted onto’ it, 
has already been spelled out by academics and judges in common law 
jurisdictions. For example, Professor William Swadling at Oxford writes: “it 
is a complete falsity to say that there is any division of ownership in the 
English law of trusts.”67 Moreover, over a half century ago, one of the 
greatest comparative lawyers, Professor F.H. Lawson, argued that the term 
‘equitable ownership’ was not a correct term to use.68 As these illustrations 
                                                                                                                            
 62. It should be noted that there is no corresponding provision as regards corporate insolvency in 
the Insolvency Act 1986. However, it is commonly considered that the same principle applies to it, see 
GERARD MCCORMACK, PROPRIETARY CLAIMS AND INSOLVENCY 7 (1997). 
 63. The separate existence of the trust fund entails its immunity from claims by the trustee’s 
spouse, heirs and personal creditors. 
 64. In so far as the law applicable to the trust requires or provides, such recognition shall imply, 
in particular, that the trust assets shall not form part of the trustee’s estate upon his insolvency or 
bankruptcy. 
 65. Tony Honoré, Trusts: The Inessentials, in RATIONALIZING PROPERTY, EQUITY AND TRUSTS: 
ESSAY IN HONOR OF EDWARD BURN 7, 9 (Joshua Getzler ed., 2003). 
 66. Tony Honoré, On Fitting Trusts into Civil Law Jurisdiction, in 27 OXFORD LEGAL STUDIES 
RESEARCH PAPER 1 (2008), http://ssrn.com.abstract=1270179.  
 67. Swadling, supra note 14, at 219, 272-74. 
 68. FREDERICK H. LAWSON, A COMMON LAWYER LOOK AT THE COMMON LAW 203 (1955). 
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show, it is possible to say that the beneficiary’s right could be a proprietary 
one,69 but trusts do not include the division of ownership such as one at law 
and another in equity. Thus beneficiary’s right should not be considered as 
ownership but as another kind of property rights. It must be remembered that 
not all property rights are ownership. The fact that equitable ‘ownership’ is a 
wrong term, and that it is not a universally accepted terminology are 
particularly important to lawyers in civilian jurisdictions. 
 
C.  The Nature of the Beneficiary’s Right 
 
1. Personal Right Approach   
 
According to some lawyers in East Asia argue the beneficiary’s right is 
a personal right; the he does not have any right over specific trust funds.70 
However, if this position is correct, it is logically impossible to 
accommodate the features of the beneficiary’s right that have been imported 
from the common law model of trusts, such as the trust’s effect in insolvency 
and its effect on third parties. These features are clearly provided for in the 
Trust Act of each of Taiwan, Japan and South Korea. 
First, as regards the effect in insolvency, Article 2(3) of the Japanese 
Trust Act defines trust funds as follows:71 “Trust funds under this Trust Act 
means all the assets which vest in the trustee and which need to be 
administered and disposed of subject to the trust terms”; and Article 2(8) 
defines the trustee’s own assets as follows: “The private assets under the 
Trust Act means that the assets which vest in the trustee and which do not 
form part of the trust funds”; these two articles implies the principle that the 
trust funds, though held by a trustee, constitute a separate fund. Furthermore, 
Article 25 provides that “When the procedures for the trustee’s bankruptcy 
commence, trust funds do not form part of the assets available to satisfy the 
trustee’s personal debts”;72 and Article 23(1) further provides that “Except 
for the purpose of satisfying debts incurred by the trust, compulsory 
execution, provisional attachment . . . realization of security, auction and 
                                                                                                                            
 69. Lionel D. Smith, Unravelling Proprietary Restitution, 40 CAN. BUS. L.J. 317 (2004); Lionel 
D. Smith, Philosophical Foundations of Proprietary Remedies, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
THE LAW OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT 281 (Robert Chambers, Charles Mitchell & James Penner eds., 
2009). 
 70. MACOTO, supra note 17, at 40-43; CHE-UNG IM, SINTAKBEOP YEONKU (신탁법 연구) 
[STUDIES ON TRUSTS LAW] 3, 31 (2009). 
 71. Though the Taiwanese and South Korean Trust Acts do not contain a provision on the 
definition of trust fund, but the same conclusion could be extracted from art. 2 of the Taiwanese Trust 
Act and art. 1 of the South Korean Trust Act: both articles provides for the definition of trust. 
 72. This is also prescribed in the Taiwanese Trust Act, art. 11 and the South Korean Trust Act, art. 
24. 
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interim injunction . . . against the trust fund are prohibited.”73 Article 23(1) 
is a logical consequence of Articles 2(3), 2(8), and 25: it is because the trust 
fund is separated from the trustee’s private assets that it is immune to any 
enforcement procedures imposed on the trustee on account of his personal 
debts. To repeat: the trust funds will not form part of the assets available for 
distribution to the trustee’s own creditors. Since the funds that the trustee 
holds as the subject matter of the trust rights are unavailable to the trustee’s 
own creditors, the beneficiary’s right under the trust is also preserved. 
Unfortunately, East Asian jurisprudence has not yet clearly explained the 
justification for shielding the trust funds from the trustee’s own creditors. 
Secondly, as regards the effect on third parties, as we have already seen, 
the Japanese Trust Act, in Articles 27(1)(ii) and 27(2)(ii), provides that the 
beneficiary is able to rescind certain transactions or dispositions made by the 
trustee.74 What we can note about this provision is that it allows the 
beneficiary to meddle with dispositions that have been made between the 
breaching trustee and a third party transferee. Defenders of the orthodox 
position should be asked why the holder of a mere personal right is capable 
of affecting a third party. The standard response is that the beneficiary’s 
right is a special personal right75 justified by the policy of protecting 
beneficiaries. However, saying the beneficiary’s right is exceptional and 
special cannot be the proper justifications, for what we are trying to verify is 
why it should be exceptional or special. 
The explanation for the personal right approach is the propensity of 
Taiwanese, Japanese and Korean lawyers to conceptualise the trust as a 
species of contract; however, considering the existing provisions on the 
effect in insolvency and the effect on third parties, and all other reasons 
discussed in the previous section (i.e., Trust as Contract), trusts are hard to 
fall within the scope of the law of contract. The beneficiary’s right over trust 
funds may be personal, but we need its legal grounds supporting its third 
party and insolvency effects. Can we say the beneficiary’s right can amount 
to a property right even in Taiwan, Japan, and Korea? 
 
2.  Property Right Approach   
 
This section, following the Roman-Germanic tradition that divides 
rights into property rights and personal rights, focuses on whether the 
beneficiary’s right will fall within the former category. Indeed, some lawyers 
                                                                                                                            
 73. The same rule is enshrined in the Taiwanese Trust Act, art. 12 and the South Korean Trust 
Act, art. 22. 
 74. Sintakbeop [Trust Act], Act. no. 10924, 25 July, 2011, art. 75 (S. Kor.); Xintuofa [Trust Act] 
1996, art. 18 (Taiwan).  
 75. MACOTO, supra note 17, at 60. 
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in East Asia argue that the beneficiary holds a right in rem over trust funds.76 
However, it will be argued that any attempt to force it into this category will 
confront practical and theoretical obstacles due to the rigid principles of the 
local law of property (Sachenrecht). This section sets out a number of 
objections to considering the structure of the beneficiary’s right to be a 
property right. 
(a) Ownership  
There is a barrier to Taiwanese, Japanese, and Korean law recognizing 
the beneficiary’s right as ownership. The Civil Code of Taiwan, Japan and 
South Korea each provides that an owner, subject to the restrictions imposed 
by laws and ordinances, has the right freely to use (usus), profit from 
(fructus) and dispose of (abusus) the assets owned.77 Furthermore, one of 
the ‘general attributes of a property right’ (i.e. a real right, a right in rem) is 
that, when the right is infringed, the right-holder has actions to vindicate his 
property in the hands of others or prevent their infringement of his right; the 
former is called rei vindicatio, the latter actio negatoria.78 Now, whilst the 
Japanese Civil Code does not have any provision expressly giving the 
property-right-holder the rei vindicatio or actio negatoria, it is a prevailing 
view that, since they are general elements of all kinds of rights in rem (e.g. 
ownership, superficies, servitude praedorium, pledge, hypothec), the Civil 
Code presupposes that such actions are available to a person who has 
ownership. However the Taiwanese and Korean Civil Codes expressly 
provide for rei vindicatio or actio negatoria.79 To sum up, the power to use 
(usus), the power to profit (fructus), the power to dispose (abusus), the 
availability of the rei vindicatio, and the availability of the actio negatoria 
are five main characteristics of ownership. And since theses jurisdictions 
adopts the concept of absolute ownership, ownership of trust fund can only 
vest in one legal entity in a trust relationship. 
Now, in the case of trusts law in Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea, 
ownership of the trust fund vests in the trustee. Therefore, the trustee has all 
of the five aspects of ownership mentioned in the previous passage. It might 
be argued that the power to profit (fructus) does not belong to the trustee 
since the trustee cannot benefit from the trust fund. 80  However, this 
argument is not correct; it misses a step before the profit goes to the 
                                                                                                                            
 76. CHOI DONG SIK, SINTAKBEOP [THE LAW OF TRUST] 328-29 (2006); SHIEH JER-SHENG, 
XINTUOFA (信託法), [THE LAW OF TRUSTS] 41-44 (2009). 
 77. Minpo [Civil Code] 1898, art. 206 (Japan); Minbeop [Civil Code], Act. no. 471, 1 Jan., 1960, 
art. 211 (S. Kor.); Minfa [Civil Code] 1929, art. 765 (Taiwan). 
 78. HIROSHI ODA, JAPANESE LAW 151 (2d ed. 1999); UCHIDA TAKASHI, MINPO I (民法I), [CIVIL 
LAW I] 367 (4th ed., 2000). 
 79. Minbeop [Civil Code], Act. no. 471, 1 Jan., 1960, arts. 213, 214 (S. Kor.); Minfa [Civil Code] 
1929, art. 767 (Taiwan). 
 80. Pierre Lepaulle, Trusts and the Civil Law, 15 J. COMP. LEGIS. & INT’L L. 18, 20 (1933). 
2015] East Asian Trusts at the Crossroads 101 
 
beneficiary’s pocket. For example, suppose a trustee invests one million yen 
in real estate, and later it produces two million yen profits. No proceeds go 
directly to the beneficiary’s pocket. It is the trustee to whom the money 
generated by the investment should be transferred, since his very role is to 
function as a conduit in passing the profits to the beneficiary. Thus, in 
normal transactions between the trustee and a third party, the benefit must 
come into the trustee’s hands first. In this sense, we can say that the benefit 
of the trust fund belongs to the trustee. The allocation to the beneficiary of 
benefits arising from the trust is the next step, governed by the trust. 
Therefore, the trustee is equipped with all of the five elements of ownership. 
The beneficiary cannot use, profit or dispose of specific trust property 
directly; these powers belong solely to the trustee. In other words, the 
beneficiary cannot qualify as an owner of the trust fund, let alone as a 
co-owner.81 East Asian law cannot help but come to the conclusion that the 
beneficiary’s right is not an ownership. Thus, if it is a property right, it must 
be another type of property right attached to the assets held (owned) by the 
trustee. Since trust assets can comprise of various types of asset, we must 
explore whether it can be attached to each type of assets (for example, (i) 
land, (ii) goods, (iii) documentary intangibles: commercial paper; (iv) 
receivables (bank accounts); (v) investment securities: stocks, shares, and 
bonds; and (vi) money). 
(b) Land 
When a trustee holds a property right (i.e. ownership or hypothec) over 
a plot of land on trust for another, a question arises whether it is possible to 
argue that the beneficiary’s right is a kind of property right attached to it. 
The short answer is that it cannot. In Taiwan, Japan, and Korea, in order to 
minimise disputes over titles to land, the law tries to ensure that property 
rights (freeholds, easements, mortgages and so on) have “universal 
exigibility”. One of the means adopted is to require each kind of property 
right over land to be registered in the public register: this is called the 
‘principle of publicity’.82 Once a property right over the land is registered, 
the right-holder’s name will appear on the public register as a recognized 
property right holder, and a subsequent buyer of the land will be able to find 
out easily who has proprietary interests in respect of the land and what kinds 
of burdens are imposed on that land. As a result, the land cannot be disposed 
of to potential buyers free of existing property rights over that land; if a 
                                                                                                                            
 81. As corollary of this, the concept of dual ownership can scarcely be accepted in Taiwan, Japan 
and South Korea, for more details, see Ying-Chieh Wu, Trust Law in South Korea: Developments and 
Challenges, in TRUST LAW IN ASIAN CIVIL JURISDICTIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 46, 57 (Lusina 
Ho & Rebecca Lee eds., 2013). 
 82. TAKASHI, supra note 78, at 437; WAGATSUMA SAKAE, BUKKENHO (物權法), [THE LAW OF 
RIGHT IN REM] 40 (1983).  
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buyer does purchase ownership of the land, he will not be able to assert his 
right against the registered holder of a property right, because the subsequent 
buyer should have known of the existence of registered property rights over 
that land. Registration functions as a means of deeming all the world to have 
known of the previous property right holder; in other words, it tells all the 
world who is entitled to assert his property rights over land against them 
(universal exigibility). Now, since registration tells people who can assert his 
property rights against all the world, the right must be a recognized property 
right recorded on the register. However, though it is possible to notify that 
the land transferred to the trustee is a trust asset, but it can hardly be said that 
the current legal regime of the three jurisdictions in question regards that the 
beneficiary of that trust has a recognized property right recorded on the 
register. The upshot is that the beneficiary cannot hold a property right that 
is attached to the land whose ownership is held by the trustee. 
(c) Personalty   
When the subject-matter of the trust rights that the trustee holds for the 
beneficiary is personalty, the same question arises: even if the beneficiary’s 
right over the personalty cannot be ownership, can it be a kind of property 
right other than ownership? This section tries to find the answer. It uses five 
kinds of personalty as testing grounds: (i) goods; (ii) documentary 
intangibles: commercial paper; (iii) receivables (bank accounts); (iv) 
investment securities: stocks, shares, and bonds; and (v) money. 
(i) Goods   
In the case of goods, a delivery (transfer of possession) must be made in 
order to acquire a property right. 83  The reason the beneficiary is not 
qualified as a holder of property right when goods are the subject-matter of 
the trust assets is that the beneficiary never takes delivery (transfer of 
possession) of the goods, sometimes the beneficiary is even not aware of 
what goods constitutes the trust funds.  
There are four types of delivery. The first is direct delivery, which 
requires one party to make a physical transfer of possession to the other. 
This usually happens in the cases of sale and pledge. In trusts, when the 
trustee buys something, it is obvious that it is the trustee who gets direct 
delivery from the seller. It may be possible for the beneficiary to take 
delivery. However, it must have been done with the agreement of the trustee 
since the contracting party (i.e. the buyer) is the trustee, not the beneficiary. 
The second type of delivery is delivery by agreement.84 This is used when 
the trustee already has possession of the goods that he wants to buy from the 
                                                                                                                            
 83. Minpo [Civil Code] 1898, art. 178 (Japan); Minbeop [Civil Code], Act. no. 471, 1 Jan., 1960, 
art. 188, para. 1 (S. Kor.); Minfa [Civil Code] 1929, art. 761, para. 1 (Taiwan). 
 84. Minpo [Civil Code] 1898, art. 182 (Japan); Minbeop [Civil Code], Act. no. 471, 1 Jan., 1960, 
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seller. Again, the parties to the agreement are the trustee and the seller, not 
the beneficiary; there is no transfer of possession to the beneficiary. The 
third type of delivery is constructive delivery.85 This method of delivery is 
employed in the case of the typical real security right, the civilian 
counterpart of the mortgage found in common law jurisdictions. For 
example, suppose A (a mortgagor) wants to take a loan from T (a lender, 
mortgagee, and trustee for B), but A does not want to provide T with the 
possession of A’s goods, since delivery of the possession of these goods to T 
would prevent A from carrying on his business. In this situation, A and T 
can make an agreement allowing A to keep the possession of the goods by 
treating the goods as though they have been delivered from A to T and then 
redelivered from T to A. Since the goods are deemed to have been once 
delivered to T (a mortagee of the titles to goods), the trustee acquires the 
titles to the goods, notwithstanding that A keeps possession of the goods. 
The example, it will be noted, also shows that the parties between whom the 
constructive delivery is made are A (the mortgagor) and T (the mortgagee); 
B is not one of these parties. The last form of delivery is delivery by 
transferring the right to the return of goods.86 For instance, if A as an owner 
has a claim to the return of goods against B, A can sell his ownership to 
those goods to C before he recovers possession of the goods from B, simply 
by transferring the right to the return of the goods that A has against B to C; 
and A is required to inform B of the transfer. Now, if A wants to sell the 
titles to the goods to a C who is a trustee of another, it is the trustee (i.e. C) 
to whom A has to transfer the right to the return of the goods in order to 
effect delivery; again, not the beneficiary.  
To conclude, since the beneficiary is in principle not a person to whom 
the delivery of goods is made, when the objects of the trust assets are goods, 
the beneficiary cannot be said to have property rights over those goods.  
(ii) Documentary intangibles: commercial paper  
In commercial transactions, ‘commercial paper’ is very often used 
between buyers and sellers. If the subject-matter of the trust funds that the 
trustee holds relate to some commercial paper, such as a negotiable 
instrument (i.e. a bill of exchange, promissory note, or cheque) or a 
document of title (i.e. a bill of lading), can we say that the beneficiary has 
property rights over the objects of those trust funds under current Taiwanese, 
Japanese, and Korean law? Let us begin by considering the nature of the 
rights that the trustee has. There is no doubt that the trustee’s rights over the 
negotiable instruments or documents of titles cannot be said to be property 
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rights; the former relates to monetary obligations (i.e. rights to claim money) 
and the latter relates to delivery obligations (i.e. rights to claim delivery of 
goods). Though the trustee may have possession of the documents, what this 
means is that the trustee has a possession right over the note itself, not a 
property right over the obligations contained in the commercial paper. This 
does not change even if the delivery of possession is crucial to the exercise 
of the personal rights contained in the commercial paper. Thus, when the 
trust funds are concerned with negotiable instruments or documents of title, 
the trustee’s rights are personal. That being so, there is no way of saying that 
the beneficiary has a property right over commercial paper, since an 
originally personal right cannot become property right in nature simply 
because it comes to be held on trust. There is nothing in specie over which 
the beneficiary could have a property right. 
In conclusion: what is embedded in a documentary intangible, such as a 
negotiable instrument or a document of title, is a personal right to claim 
money (in the case of a negotiable instrument) or goods (in the case of a 
document of title), and this does not change even if the relevant commercial 
paper is held on trust. Therefore, where a trust fund is made up of 
commercial paper, it is hard to see the beneficiary as a holder of property 
right over it. 
(iii) Receivables  
If A owes B a debt, this means B is a creditor and A is a debtor. There is 
no doubt that B’s credit is a type of personal right. Thus, we do not say that 
A (debtor) is subject to B’s (creditor) property right; A is only personally 
bound to pay B a certain sum of money, viz., B is only the holder of a 
personal right. So, if a debt owed by A (debtor) to B (creditor) is held by B 
(trustee/creditor) under a trust, it seems impossible to say that C, a 
beneficiary, has a property right over the debt; the trustee’s right itself is 
only a personal claim against B.87 This reflects the preceding discussion of 
documentary intangibles. Therefore, when trust rights are receivables, it 
cannot be said that the beneficiary has property rights over them; the 
creation of the trust cannot cause the subject-matter to mutate into property 
rights.  
(iv) Investment securities   
If a trustee’s rights relate to investment securities such as shares and 
bonds, can we consider that the beneficiary has property rights over those 
funds? It may be helpful first to identify what manner of right the trustee has 
against those investment securities. In the case of bonds, what the trustee has 
is a personal right against, for example, the central government, a public 
authority, or some commercial entity, since the interests springing from the 
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bonds are the reward for the loan that either the settlor or trustee made to 
those bond issuers. Therefore, the same argument can be relied upon as was 
relied upon above: the beneficiary cannot have property rights over personal 
rights that the trustee has. The same conclusion is reached in cases where the 
subject-matter of the trustee’s rights includes shares. It may be thought that a 
share-holder has a property right, reasoning from the premise that the shares 
represent a proportion of the net capital of the company (linked to the sum 
contributed on the share’s issue) to the conclusion that the share-holders 
have property rights over the company’s assets. However, this is not the 
case: the effect of purchasing or investing in shares is to gain the opportunity 
to receive dividends paid by the company business and to obtain powers 
such as the power to vote or take part in corporate governance. One 
important thing that should be noted is that the documents themselves (the 
certificates themselves) are becoming less and less important; 
dematerialisation of the certificate is spreading around the world in 
commercial transactions. Unlike the case of documentary intangibles such as 
the commercial papers mentioned above, where possession of the documents 
must be acquired in order for the rights they represent to be exercised, the 
paper involved in the issue of investment securities, which can be called 
documented intangibles, is merely evidence of entitlement to the securities; 
thus it is possible for all securities to be held in and handled by a 
computerised database, without documents. As a result, when a trustee holds 
shares, whether they are bought directly from the company or from 
intermediaries, the rights he has are personal ones to receive the benefits 
produced by the company. Therefore, the same conclusion must be reached 
as in the case of receivables, that the beneficiary’s rights cannot be rights in 
rem when the trustee’s rights are shares. 
(v) Money  
The most controversial potential subject-matter of a property right in 
Taiwan, Japan, and Korea, would undoubtedly be ‘money’.88 Money as 
currency is not only a tangible thing (when focusing on its physical 
constituents, such as metal or paper), but also a store of value used as a 
universal means of exchange. When considering the possibility of a property 
right (real right) on money, it seems that only the former feature (i.e. money 
as a tangible thing) gives rise to the possibility that money could be the 
object of a property right; the latter feature (money as a store of value used 
as a universal means of exchange) can be used as a ground for refusing to 
accept money as the subject-matter of a property right. To illustrate, when I 
have ten pounds in my pocket, there is no problem with regard to me 
                                                                                                                            
 88. ‘Money’ in this section is used to denote ‘physical money’ such as coins and notes; thus, 
electronic money and bank money are excluded from the debate; those two kinds of money need 
special treatment which is out of the scope of this thesis. 
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excluding anyone who tries to pickpocket the ten pounds from me. My 
intention with regard to the pickpocket can be construed as this: “Do not 
touch my ‘coins or notes’!”89 Since the ten pounds possessed by me and 
kept in my pocket can be specifically identified by physical material (coins 
or notes), it is treated as a corporeal or ‘tangible’ thing (the first feature), and 
nobody is allowed to make physical contact with it without my permission. 
Accordingly, in the case where I have possession of money, I am capable of 
asserting a property right over it. 
The story changes dramatically when the coins or notes are not 
possessed by me, e.g. because they are handed either to an agent for certain 
purposes, or to a bank as a deposit, or because they are stolen by someone 
else. Money in this case is deemed to be a store of value used as a ‘universal 
means of exchange’. Since money is treated as a ‘general’ means of 
exchange, any coins or notes making up ten pounds will suffice to repay me 
the ten pounds owed to me by the agent or the bank. It does not need to be 
the particular coins or notes that I previously handed over. So, even if I did 
have property rights over coins or notes that I gave to the agent or the bank, 
or over coins or notes that were stolen, I would no longer have property 
rights over those coins or notes. All I would be entitled to do would be to ask 
for the return of coins or notes of the same value, ten pounds; I would have a 
personal claim to be paid ten pounds. In short, when money leaves my 
possession and mixed with other funds, my property rights over it would 
very much probably leave me as well.90 This, though in slightly different 
wording, is expressed by the Supreme Court of Japan as follows: “Title to 
money rests with the possession of it.”91 In short, when the trustee’s rights 
are titles to money, the beneficiary cannot be said to have property rights 
since the physical form of the money has never been in the beneficiary’s 
possession. 
 
3.  The Numerus Clausus Rule   
 
This part discusses the impact on the argument under consideration of 
the numerus clausus92 rule in Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea. The Civil 
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 90. Minfa [Civil Code] 1929, art. 813 (Taiwan); TZE-CHIAN WANG (王澤鑑), PUTANG TELI (不
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Code of each of those countries provides for the numerus clausus rule, i.e., 
no proprietary rights can be created except those provided for in this code or 
in other laws.93 Since the possibility of new kinds of proprietary right is left 
open by the provision for ‘other laws’, proprietary rights can be newly 
produced when new legislation is promulgated. The question arises: do the 
Japanese Trust Acts come within the scope of these ‘other laws’ that might 
generate new types of proprietary right?94 If so, the beneficiary’s right can 
fit into the ‘Proprietary’ category.  
As noted above, while the Japanese Trust Act does have an ‘insolvency 
effect’ and a ‘third party effect’, the beneficiary’s right under Japanese law, 
as seen in the last section, does not meet the preconditions of being a 
property right, whether the trust funds comprise land or personalty. 
Therefore, it cannot easily be concluded that the beneficiary’s right is a 
property right. Therefore, the Trust Act cannot be considered to fall within 
the reference to “other laws” in the article that provides for the numerus 
clausus rule.  
 
4.  The Beneficiary’s Right of Rescission 
 
The Trust Act of each of Taiwan, Japan, and Korea awards the 
beneficiary a right to rescind the transaction concluded between the trustee 
and the third party.95 The question is whether we can regard this third-party 
effect as proof that the law considers the beneficiary’s right as having 
proprietary nature. Some may argue that this is so. However, the fact the 
beneficiary is entitled to rescind the transaction entered into between the 
trustee and the third party cannot be used as evidence that the law indirectly 
accords to the beneficiary a property right, since the beneficiary would 
simply be able to directly assert his property right if his right is proprietary; 
he does not need to borrow rescission in order to exercise his property 
right.96 Therefore, the existence of the right of rescission can hardly be used 
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as a ground of arguing the beneficiary’s right is a property right.  
 
D.  Conclusion 
 
As has been explained above, the nature of the beneficiary’s right over 
trust funds has been regarded as a property right in common law 
jurisdictions. However, the same approach cannot be accepted in Taiwan, 
Japan, and Korea. The stringent rules regarding the acquisition of property 
rights over land and personalty prevent the beneficiary’s right over trust 
funds from being a property right. Moreover, the Trust Act of each of 
Taiwan, Japan, and Korea can scarcely be regarded as an act that produces 
property right for the beneficiary: it does not meet the numerous clausus 
rule.  
If the beneficiary’s right is not a property right, it must be a personal 
right (though not a contractual right as mentioned in the previous section) in 
its nature according to the Roman dichotomy. The problem is how to explain 
the third-party and insolvency effects if the beneficiary’s right is only 
personal; and this is the issue to which we are now turning. 
 
IV. TRUST AS SEPARATE PATRIMONY 
 
A. Introduction 
 
In the previous two parts, it has been found that both contract-based and 
property-based arguments are not immune to criticisms. If the trust can be 
squeezed into neither category, a third approach must be explored and some 
lawyers in other civilian and mixed jurisdictions explain the nature of trusts 
by using the concept of ‘special’ or ‘separate’ patrimony (i.e. contrasting 
personal patrimony and trust patrimony).97 Since Taiwan, Japan, and South 
Korea are civilian jurisdictions, it is worth examining whether this view is 
also acceptable in the legal systems in question. In discussing this, two 
issues are indispensible: first, what is separate patrimony and whether the 
concept of ‘separate’ patrimony is familiar to Roman (or civilian) law 
tradition; and second, whether it fits the current trust law of Taiwan, Japan, 
and Korea. Therefore, this chapter looks for the Roman law origins of the 
“special” or “separate patrimony” analysis, and attempts to some legislative 
grounds supporting the separate-patrimony argument from the trust law of 
                                                                                                                            
 97. TONY HONORÉ & EDWIN CAMERON, HONORÉ’S SOUTH AFRICAN LAW OF TRUSTS 493 (4th 
ed., 1992); Gretton, supra note 87; Kenneth Reid, Patrimony not Equity: The Trust in Scotland, 3 EUR. 
REV. PRIVATE L. 427 (2000); FRANS SONNEVELDT, THE TRUST: BRIDGE OR ABYSS BETWEEN 
COMMON AND CIVIL LAW JURISDICTIONS? 5 (K. L. M. van Mens & Harrie L. van Mens eds., 1992); 
NICOLAS MALUMIAN, TRUST IN LATIN AMERICA (2009). 
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Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea. 
 
B.  Separate Patrimony and Roman Law 
 
This section examines the view that some institutions of Roman law 
could be interpreted as examples of the concept of special or separate 
patrimony; and the view that the concept of separate patrimony can be used 
to explain the nature of trusts. Before examining the civilian or Roman 
examples of separate patrimony, it may be helpful to explain the meaning of 
‘patrimony’ first. The word patrimony broadly denotes the entirety of the 
rights (both the personal rights that form part of the law of obligations and 
the proprietary rights that form part of the law of property98) and liabilities of 
a legal person. 99  However, ever since Roman law periods, civilian 
jurisdictions have also embraced the possibility of having two patrimonies. 
The two major examples given by the proponents of this view are dos100 and 
peculium101.102 For example, Professor George Gretton has argued that: “In 
general, the principle is: one person, one patrimony. Everyone has a 
patrimony, no one has more than one. But civilian tradition admitted 
qualifications to this principle. As well as his ordinary patrimony, a person 
could sometimes have a “special patrimony”. (Such as dos or peculium in the 
Roman law)103 In a similar vein, Professor Tony Honoré wrote that: “[t]he 
trust estate is a separate fund vested in the trustee . . . The conception of a 
separate fund is not confined to common law systems. Other systems of law 
admit or have admitted the idea: for example the peculium of Roman 
law . . . ”104  
We can find a couple of texts in the Digest of Justinian,105 the Institutes 
                                                                                                                            
 98. Here, ‘property’ is used as opposed to obligation; therefore, it does not include debt. 
 99. See Marius De Waal & Roderick Paisley, Trusts, in MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS IN 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: PROPERTY AND OBLIGATIONS IN SCOTLAND AND SOUTH AFRICA 819, 
839 (Reinhard Zimermann, Daniel Visser & Kenneth Reid eds., 2004); Lionel Smith, Trust and 
Patrimony, 28 ESTATES, TRUSTS AND PENSIONS J. 332, 335 (2009); BARRY NICHOLAS, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 235 (1975). 
 100. Dos was a gift given to a husband by his wife or another person on her behalf as her 
contribution towards the expenses that would be incurred during their married life, see NICHOLAS, 
supra note 99, at 88. 
 101. Peculium denoted the assets (for example, horses or money) given to a slave by his master, 
to be at the disposal of the slave, see WILLIAM WARWICK BUCKLAND, A TEXT-BOOK OF ROMAN LAW: 
FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN 65 (3rd. ed., 1963).  
 102. The fideicommissum in Roman law is sometimes compared to the trust in English law see 
DAVID JOHNSTON, THE ROMAN LAW OF TRUSTS (1988). Since the fideicommissum is not a concept 
used to explain the concept of separate patrimony, the comparison of the two institutions is not dealt 
with in this chapter. 
 103. Gretton, supra note 87, 609. 
 104. Tony Honoré, Obstacles to the Reception of Trust Law? The Examples of South Africa and 
Scotland, in AEQUITAS AND EQUITY: EQUITY IN CIVIL LAW AND MIXED JURISDICTIONS 793, 812 
(Alfredo Mordechai Rabello ed., 1997). 
 105. DIG. 5. 3. 25; 10. 2. 38; 12. 6. 61; 23. 3. 1; 46. 6. 9. 
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of Justinian106 and the Institutes of Gaius107 where the word ‘patrimony’ is 
used. When a person dies, his/her patrimony devolves upon his/her 
successor; in other words, the contents of an inheritance are the rights 
contained in the predecessor’s patrimony. As a result, all the predecessor’s 
rights and liabilities are generally automatically transferred to his heir(s) 
from the moment of the predecessor’s death. What the arguments for 
regarding the trust fund as a separate patrimony try to do is to make it 
possible for the trustee to have two patrimonies,108 and they argue that 
examples of the usage of separate patrimony can be found from the Roman 
legal period onwards. There are two examples: dos and peculium. It will be 
disclosed that these Roman illustrations could be seen as cases in which 
some assets were managed separately, thus, for a separate patrimony. 
 
1. Dos (Dowry) as Separate Patrimony109 
 
Dos was a gift given to a husband by his wife or another person110 on 
her behalf as her contribution towards the expenses that would be incurred 
during their married life.111 Dos was not a legal duty imposed on the wife 
when getting married, but it functioned as evidence of the marriage when 
legal formality was absent.112 Since dos was provided to the husband in 
order to alleviate the husband’s economic burdens (ad sustinenda onera 
matrimomii) arising from the conjugal life, the assets contributed by the 
woman were not subject to the rules otherwise applying to dos if the 
marriage did not take place or was void. 113  Thus, it was offered 
conditionally on the marriage taking place. But once the marriage was 
established, the assets transferred to the husband as dos became wholly the 
assets of the husband;114 in other words, the husband acquired the full rights 
to the assets involved in the dos. So, if the dos contained a piece of land or a 
chattel, the husband obtained the dominium (ownership right) of it; if it 
contained more limited real rights (iura in re aliena) such as servitus, 
                                                                                                                            
 106. J. INST. 2. 1. pr. 
 107. G. INST. 2. 1. 
 108. For example, “Usually patrimony and personality coincide, so that a person has one 
patrimony only, comprising the totality of his assets and liability. In a trust, however, there are two 
patrimonies held by one person. A trustee, like everyone else, has his own private (or general 
patrimony. But in addition he has the trust patrimony”, see Reid, supra note 97, at 427, 432. 
 109. For a full account of the rules on dos, see The Digest of Justinian, Books XXIII and XXIV; 
English translations are available from THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN Vol. 2 (Alan Watson ed., 2009). 
 110. The dos could be offered by the bride’s father. When dos was provided by the bride’s father, 
it was called profecticia dos (See DIG. 23. 3. 5). 
 111. See NICHOLAS, supra note 99, at 88; ROBERT WARDEN LEE, THE ELEMENTS OF ROMAN 
LAW 150 (4th ed., 1956). 
 112. BUCKLAND, supra note 101, at 107. 
 113. DIG. 23. 3. 3. 
 114. DIG. 23. 1. 1. 
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superficies, ius emphyteuticum or real security, the husband became the 
proprietary right holder of those interests. Likewise, if the dos contained the 
right that arises from a contract of a loan, that right in personam would be 
vested in the husband; even the right to release someone from his debt could 
be the subject matter of the dos115 and the husband would be able to exercise 
that right of release. It is clear that both personal rights and proprietary rights 
were vested in the husband once the dos was given to him and the marriage 
had successfully taken place. But the husband, as the owner of the 
contributed assets, was required to administer them for the benefit of the 
marriage. So, dos appears quite like a trust fund, in that certain rights 
(whether personal or proprietary) are vested in the husband and he has to 
manage or use them for a specific purpose, i.e., to diminish the economic 
burdens stemming from married life. We soon notice that it involves the 
protection of the separate fund. 
As mentioned above, some lawyers have argued that the trust fund is a 
separate patrimony and that we can find the concept of separate patrimony in 
Roman institutions such as dos. Now, let us have a close look at the means 
by which the dos was protected and see whether the concept of separate 
patrimony existed or functioned at all in the mechanisms of the Roman dos. 
The protection of dos developed in four stages. The first was the early 
Roman law period.116 In this period, after the assets comprising the dos were 
provided to the husband by the wife’s family, they became a contribution to 
the expenses of the household, and the rights (whether in rem or in 
personam) to those assets became wholly and irrevocably vested in the 
husband.117 Therefore, the wife had no right at all against the transferred 
rights involved in the dos, and the husband was not burdened by any 
obligation to return them.118 So, the husband was capable of using those 
rights for purposes having nothing to do with the marital life. However, the 
wife could stipulate for the return of the value of the dos if the marriage were 
to break-up through cautio rei uxoriae.119 Indeed, it was only on the basis of 
the written memorandum of cautio rei uxoriae that the wife was able to 
pursue any interest in the value of the dos in early Roman law.  
The second stage is the pre-classical period.120 The protection of the 
wife’s interests was much improved in this period as a reaction to the 
                                                                                                                            
 115. DIG. 23. 3. 43 pr. and 1. 
 116. From the formation of the city-state of Rome to the middle of the third century BC. 
 117. NICHOLAS, supra note 99, at 88. 
 118. BUCKLAND, supra note 101, at 108-09. 
 119. Cautio is a memorandum of a transaction sealed by one or both parties, see BUCKLAND, 
supra note 101, at 461. 
 120. From the middle of the third century BC to the early first century AD. The second stage is 
especially linked to the period from the beginning of the second century BC to the late period of the 
first century BC; and this period is specifically called the Republic. 
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increase in the number of divorces.121 The wife could initiate a legal suit 
developed in this period called the actio rei uxoriae, and require the return of 
the value of the rights that the wife’s family had offered as dos. Differently 
to the early Roman law period, no expressly written stipulation was needed. 
Rather, the wife automatically acquired that right, and she could sue for the 
value of the dos once the marriage was terminated. 
The third stage is the classical period. 122  The actio rei uxoriae, 
developed in the pre-classical period, survived into the classical period. 
However, in the time when Augustus was Emperor of Rome, he had 
furthered the protection of the wife’s interests through the ‘Julian Act on 
Adultery’ (Lex Julia de Adulteriis). Under this Act, a husband could not 
alienate any Italic land123 forming part of the dos even if the ownership of 
that land was vested in him.124 If Italic land forming part of the dos was 
alienated in violation of the Lex Julia de Adulteriis, the alienation could be 
declared void.125 Thus, even in the husband’s insolvency, Italic land could 
not be sold to satisfy his debts. According to the Institutes of Justinian, the 
basis for the protection of the value of the land offered to the husband as dos 
was the prevention of the weakness of the female sex from being abused to 
the detriment of the fortunes that had been advanced to the husband by the 
wife’s side.126 In other words, this policy-motivated rule was rooted in the 
idea of paternalism.  
The fourth period is the post-classical period, when Justinian became 
the Emperor of Eastern Rome.127 In this period, the Emperor Justinian 
abolished the actio rei uxoriae. Instead, a better -systematized legal 
technique, the actio ex stipulatu, became the wife’s general remedy.128 The 
actio ex stipulatu was a legal action that could be used by a person who had 
a right in personam by the product of a verbal contract,129 and in the time of 
Justinian130 this verbal contract was implied by law once a marriage took 
place. Therefore, when the marriage ended, the wife could use the actio ex 
stipulatu to require the husband to return the rights transferred to him as dos. 
Again, land (but not other kinds of assets) was secure, since Justinian 
                                                                                                                            
 121. NICHOLAS, supra note 99, at 88. 
 122. From the early first century AD to the middle of 3rd century AD. 
 123. I.e. the whole of Italy and the land of some privileged communities that was treated as if it 
were Italian, see NICHOLAS, supra note 99, at 105.  
 124. G. INST. 2. 63; see both Latin and English texts translated by WILLIAM GORDON & OLIVIA 
ROBINSON, THE INSTITUTION OF GAIUS 150-51 (1988). 
 125. BUCKLAND, supra note 101, at 110-11. 
 126. J. INST. 2. 8 pr.; see both Latin and English texts translated by THOMAS COLLETT 
SANDARS, THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 153-54 (7th ed., 1941). 
 127. In the sixth century AD. 
 128. J. INST. 4. 6. 29; CODE JUST. 5. 13. 1; BUCKLAND, supra note 101, at 110. 
 129. For more information about the actio ex stipulatu, see BUCKLAND, supra note 101, at 434. 
 130. Inst. 4. 6. 29. 
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retained the rule prescribed in the Lex Julia de Adulteriis on the 
inalienability of Italic land comprising part of the dos; indeed, the rule was 
even expanded to cover non-Italic land. What then if the husband became 
insolvent? Justinian decided to protect the wife’s interests in dos and give 
her a preferred position amongst the husband’s creditors through an action 
called vindicatio utilis,131 which protected wife’ dos from other creditors of 
her husband. Thus, dos was indeed a separate patrimony, and civil tradition 
is familiar to this concept since Roman law periods.  
 
2.  Peculium as Separate Patrimony 
 
In Roman times, slavery was an institution of the jus gentium,132 
whereby someone was made the subject of the ownership of another.133 As a 
result, the slaves were in the power of their owners, and owners held the 
power of life and death over them and acquired whatever their slaves 
acquired.134 It could be said that a slave, being alieni iuris (in the power of 
another) under Roman law, was like a human chattel or an animal capable of 
being owned135 by his master. Though a slave was deemed as a thing in law, 
he was still a human being who needed some assets for his living, and the 
peculium served this purpose. Peculium denoted the assets (for example, 
horses or money) given to a slave by his master, to be at the disposal of the 
slave; thus, the peculium was used at the slave’s discretion for his living 
expenses or business transactions.136 In other words, peculium was asset 
whose title was held by the master for the benefit of his slave. The reason 
that peculium is said to be a case of separate patrimony is simply that the 
master held the legal rights relating to the peculium and they were treated 
separately from the master’s other assets, since possession of the assets 
forming part of the peculium were in the hands of the slave. The master’s 
rights over the peculium and all of his other rights were managed separately, 
since the slave administered the peculium possessed by him. The separate 
patrimony argument is reinforced by the fact that slaves could buy his 
freedom from his master using the peculium in his hands.137 This clearly 
shows the fact that peculium, though held by the master, was actually used 
                                                                                                                            
 131. SEUNG-JONG HYUN, SEUNG-JONG HYUN & KYU-CHANG CHO, ROMABEOP (로마법) 
[ROMAN LAW] 987 (1996); BUCKLAND, supra note 101, at 110. 
 132. The Jus gentium was the law applied to all the states of the Roman Empire (G. INST. 1. 1.). 
 133. DIG. 1. 5. 4. 1. This English translation is from Watson, supra note 109, at 15. 
 134. G. INST. 1. 52; slaves in Roman law were not necessarily persons in chains or imprisoned; 
certain slaves performed work nowadays done by clerks or servants, see BUCKLAND, supra note 101, 
at 62; NICHOLAS, supra note 99, at 65. 
 135. BUCKLAND, supra note 101, at 62; NICHOLAS, supra note 99, at 69. 
 136. BUCKLAND, supra note 101, at 65. 
 137. DIG. 40. 1. 4. 1, This English translation is from Watson, supra note 109, at 15. 
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for the benefit of his slave. Once again, we see an example of separate 
patrimony from Roman law; it is not a new idea to the civil tradition. 
  
C.  Trust Fund as Separate Patrimony 
 
In the previous section, it was demonstrated that we can regard the 
Roman institutions of dos and peculium as examples of separate patrimony. 
In this section, We will scrutinize some legislative grounds that can possibly 
show us that trust fund functions as a separate patrimony.  
 
1.  Legislative Grounds 
 
(a) Real subrogation   
First is related to the application of real subrogation to trust funds. In the 
Trust Act of each of Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea provide that, beside the 
assets that, by the terms of the trust instrument, ought to be included in the 
trust fund, the proceeds the trustee acquires when the trust funds are 
disposed of, destroyed, damaged and so on should also form part of trust 
fund.138 Thus, if the trustee obtains land using money from the trust fund, 
the land will stand in place of the money and form part of the trust fund; and 
if a building within the trust fund is destroyed and the trustee receives 
insurance money, the latter becomes part of the trust fund. In other words, 
what comes into the hands of the trustee at the expense of the trust fund is 
substituted for the original trust assets and becomes part of the new trust 
fund. It is this feature of real subrogation of the trust fund that shows it is an 
autonomous separate patrimony because what the trustee acquires as trustee 
becomes part of the trust fund and separated from other non-trust funds held 
by the trustee.  
(b) Trustee’s liability for damages, right to indemnity and duty of 
distribution 
Following the argument based on real subrogation, we can rely on 
provisions of the Trust Act in Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea dealing with 
the trustee’s liability for damages, right to indemnity and duty of distribution 
to show that even the Acts virtually treat the trust fund itself as a separate 
patrimony. The first Article to discuss is that which deals with the trustee’s 
liability to compensate or restore the trust fund. The Trust Act of each 
jurisdiction provides that139 if any of the following events happen due to the 
trustee’s breach of his duty, the beneficiary can claim from the trustee either 
                                                                                                                            
 138. Sintakuho [Trust Act] 2006, art. 16 (Japan); Sintakbeop [Trust Act], Act. no. 10924, 25 July, 
2011, art. 27 (S. Kor.); Xintuofa [Trust Act] 1996, art. 9 (Taiwan).  
 139. Sintakuho [Trust Act] 2006, art. 40 (Japan); Sintakbeop [Trust Act], Act. no. 10924, 25 July, 
2011, art. 43 (S. Kor.); Xintuofa [Trust Act] 1996, art. 23 (Taiwan). 
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(i) monetary compensation of the loss, if any, to the trust fund, or (ii) 
restoration of the trust fund.” This Article presupposes the legal relationship 
that exits between the trustee and the trust fund. Otherwise, the trustee would 
not need to pay compensation for damage to the trust fund, since the relevant 
trust fund are all vested in himself. In other words, since the trust fund 
belonged neither to the settlor nor to the beneficiary, the trustee was required 
to compensate the loss suffered by the trust fund itself, as a separate 
patrimony comprising one or multiple assets. For example, suppose the 
trustee had ownership of land X and it was damaged by the trustee. if trustee 
was the sole entity with ownership of land X, there is no reason for him to be 
charged with a duty not to damage land X and to compensate for such 
damage or restore the value of the land should such damage occur; if he is 
obliged to pay compensation to make restoration of land X, this must be 
because land X itself forms a separate patrimony, and the trustee’s liability 
must actually be towards the separate patrimony he administers. 
Second, the separate patrimony argument is supported by the fact that 
the trustee has a right of indemnity for liabilities properly incurred140 and a 
duty to pay for the debt arising from the trust affairs.141 As to the former, 
i.e., the trustee’s right to indemnity means that a trustee has the right to be 
indemnified out of the trust fund for his expenses, and the interest on those 
expenses thereafter, if the trustee pays expenses necessary for the 
management of the trust from his private assets. As to the latter, it denotes 
that in a trust where multiple trustees exist, each trustee is jointly and 
severally liable for any debt to a third party incurred by any of the trustees in 
the management of the trust. Thus, on the one hand, the law provides that the 
trustee is liable for any debts arising from the administration of the trust; on 
the other hand, the law entitles the trustee to recover the cost of expenses of 
the trust fund he has paid from his non-trust assets. And it can be easily be 
inferred that the reason the trustee can be reimbursed in this way is that the 
trust fund itself is liable for the trust debt; since the trustee has used his 
non-trust funds for the trust, the law establishes a repayment relationship 
between the trustee and the trust fund by permitting the former to recoup the 
cost out of a segregated trust fund. The key point here is that the trustee’s 
right to indemnity must be against a separated patrimony, for it is impossible 
for a person to be reimbursed from something belonging to private 
patrimony. 
The third issue in this section is the trustee’s duty to distribute the 
benefit of the trust fund to the beneficiary only from the trust fund. For 
                                                                                                                            
 140. Sintakuho [Trust Act] 2006, art. 48, para. 1 (Japan); Sintakbeop [Trust Act], Act. no. 10924, 
25 July, 2011, art. 46 (S. Kor.); Xintuofa [Trust Act] 1996, art. 39 (Taiwan). 
 141. Sintakuho [Trust Act] 2006, art. 100 (Japan); Sintakbeop [Trust Act], Act. no. 10924, 25 
July, 2011, art. 51 (S. Kor.); Xintuofa [Trust Act] 1996, art. 29 (Taiwan). 
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example, the East Asian jurisdictions all prescribe that, in relation to the 
implementation of the duty to distribute the benefit, the trustee is only 
obliged to perform that duty using the asset contained in the trust fund.142 
The reason why the trustee does not have to perform his duty to distribute 
from his private assets is that the trustee himself owes nothing personally to 
the beneficiary; only the trust patrimony itself is allowed to be used for the 
beneficiary. As a result, the trustee’s right to indemnity for a liability 
properly incurred, and his duty to distribute the benefit of the trust fund to 
the beneficiary provides us with some persuasive evidence that the Trust Act 
of each of Taiwan, Japan, and Korea treat the trust fund as a distinct separate 
patrimony.   
(c) Trust liability   
The final legislative source that could function as proof that the law 
treats the trust fund as a separate patrimony is the article dealing with the 
devolution of trust liability. When a trustee retires or is removed and a fresh 
trustee appointed, the law provides that the latter succeeds to the rights and 
duties (or liabilities) of the former trustee.143 The fact that the former 
trustee’s liabilities are automatically taken over by the latter trustee proves 
that those liabilities are actually attached to the trust patrimony rather that 
the trustee himself, and that the trustee when in office is only dealing with 
the liabilities of the trust fund. Thus, it is possible to say that the trustee, 
though holding the trust fund, occupies the office of the administrator of 
trust patrimony.144  
(d) The bankruptcy-effect and the third-party effect 
The Trust Act of each of Taiwan, Japan, and Korea requires that trust 
fund be carved out of the trustee’s personal assets should he become 
bankrupt (the bankruptcy effect).145 This clearly shows that trust fund forms 
a separate patrimony, for otherwise it should be part of the trustee’s 
bankruptcy assets and used to meet his own creditors’ rights. Trust funds are 
vested in the trustee, yet they are protected and segregated from the trustee’s 
personal assets if he goes insolvent: this demonstrates the law actually treats 
trust fund separately from the trustee’s personal assets: trust fund is a 
separate patrimony which exists as opposed to trustee’s personal patrimony.  
We have seen that the beneficiary has the right to rescind the deal made 
between the trustee and the third party if it is concluded in breach of trust 
                                                                                                                            
 142. Sintakuho [Trust Act] 2006, art. 100 (Japan); Sintakbeop [Trust Act], Act. no. 10924, 25 
July, 2011, art. 38 (S. Kor.); Xintuofa [Trust Act] 1996, art. 30 (Taiwan).  
 143. Sintakuho [Trust Act] 2006, art. 75 (Japan); Sintakbeop [Trust Act], Act. no. 10924, 25 July, 
2011, art. 53 (S. Kor.); Xintuofa [Trust Act] 1996, art. 48 (Taiwan). 
 144. Gretton, supra note 87, at 599, 618.  
 145. Sintakuho [Trust Act] 2006, art. 23 (Japan); Sintakbeop [Trust Act], Act. no. 10924, 25 July, 
2011, art. 24 (S. Kor.); Xintuofa [Trust Act] 1996, art. 11 (Taiwan). 
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and the third party is not a bona fide purchaser (the third-party effect).146 It 
has also been found that the beneficiary’s right of rescission cannot be based 
on the property argument. The present work argues that it can properly be 
interpreted and supported by the separate patrimony approach. Since trust 
funds should be administered and distributed for certain purposes and treated 
separately from the trustee’s own assets, if the trustee disposes of them in 
breach of trust, and the third party transferee is aware of the breach and that 
the assets belonging to that separate patrimony, the policy decision of the 
law makers prefers the beneficiary’s interest, thus awards him a right of 
rescission to deny the transaction and recovers the dissipated fund back to 
the trust patrimony. It must be stressed that the beneficiary’s right of 
rescission helps to recover the dissipated assets back to trust patrimony, not 
to the trustee’s or beneficiary’s own pocket: thus, the key player here is the 
concept of separate patrimony from which the two most important effects are 
drawn. 
 
D. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, two themes were discussed: one was the likelihood that 
the concept of separate patrimony has a Roman origin; the other was the 
plausibility of regarding the trust fund as a separate patrimony. The 
argument for the concept of separate patrimony and the attempt to locate it in 
Roman law were both found sufficient. For example, separate patrimony can 
be found in the Roman concepts of dos and peculium since it was forming a 
segregated asset conferred on the wife and the slave that protected the dos 
and peculium, just as trust fund is separately protected. And the trust fund 
can be regarded as functioning as a separate patrimony, for both the 
provisions of the Trust Act in Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea provide us 
with the confidence to accord the character of separate patrimony to the trust 
fund. Since both the historical and the modern interpretations of the concept 
of separate patrimony are convincing; the concept of separate patrimony 
could be a third way that those civilian jurisdictions having trusts law can 
take. It must be emphasized that the doctrine of separate patrimony is widely 
taken in some mixed (Scotland,147 Quebec,148 South Africa149) or civilian 
jurisdictions (France150 and almost all South American Countries151) having 
                                                                                                                            
 146. Sintakuho [Trust Act] 2006, art. 27 (Japan); Sintakbeop [Trust Act], Act. no. 10924, 25 July, 
2011, art. 75 (S. Kor.); Xintuofa [Trust Act] 1996, art. 18 (Taiwan). 
 147. Reid, supra note 97, at 427. 
 148. Civil Code of Quebec, art. 1261 (Can.); Smith, supra note 99, at 332, 334. 
 149. Waal & Paisley, supra note 99, at 819. 
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trusts law. It is surprising that little attention has been paid to these 
jurisdictions in Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea, yet they merit very much 
examination, not only because they have civilian elements in their legal 
system, but also because they have more experiences in resolving the 
doctrinal issues as concerned with the law of trust.152 
Being unable to be wedged into either property or contract pigeon-hole, 
trust is best to be seen as a separate patrimony being segregated from the 
trustee’s personal patrimony, and the trustee, having the office of the trust, is 
personally liable to the beneficiary in managing the trust. In conclusion, trust 
creates separate patrimony and personal rights for the beneficiary. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
For the last couple of decades, the structure of trust has been an issue 
into which many distinguished lawyers in East Asia have delved. The work 
owes a great deal to them. In other words, the current work is no more than a 
try to add onto the signboard having already established by them, though 
with a different direction. The first direction we have explored was a 
contract-based approach. However, the facts that a trust can be created 
without mutual consent, that the beneficiary of a trust is capable of 
recovering his specific funds from a recipient third party by exercising his 
right of rescission, and that judicial intervention is normally permitted, are 
sufficient to tell us that the mechanics of trust are distinct from those of 
contract. The second direction we have looked at was a property-based 
approach. However, the stringent rules regarding the acquisition of property 
rights over land and personalty prevent the beneficiary’s right over trust 
funds from being a property right. Moreover, the Trust Acts of each of 
Taiwan, Japan and South Korea does not meet the numerous clausus rule. 
The last direction we have probed was a separate-patrimony-based approach; 
and it was argued that the approach was worth considering for the 
aforementioned historical and legislative grounds addressed in Section III of 
the work. Especially, experiences of those mixed jurisdictions and some civil 
jurisdictions where trusts have been successfully administered would have 
profound significance for East Asia. This fact cannot be overlooked, for their 
legal system involves both common and civil law elements. They are 
jurisdictions which have endeavoured to solve the questions arising from the 
                                                                                                                            
 152. It must be noted that a distinguished academic in Taiwan has long categorized trust fund as a 
case of separate (or special) patrimony, see TZE-CHIAN WAN (王澤鑑), MINFA ZONGTZE (民法總則) 
[GENERAL RULES OF CIVIL LAW] 258 (2014); the truth is that sondervermögen and zweckvermögen 
under German law, and bankruptcy assets and deceased’s assets in the middle of the succession 
process can all be said to be good examples of separate patrimony, for they are assets belonging to 
someone, yet having to be administered and protected separately.  
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conflicts springing from having trust law along with civilian concepts (as 
briefly mentioned before, even French law adopted a trust based on the 
doctrine of separate patrimony). Their trust law merits our investigation,153 
for they have passed the cross road we are now wandering about. However, 
the present author admits whether the doctrine of separate patrimony can 
assist us to find a way out of this crossroads needs further examining and 
testing in the future. 
                                                                                                                            
 153. The author plans to conduct a more extensive research on the trust law of France and mixed 
jurisdictions in another paper. 
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處於十字路口的東亞信託法 
吳 英 傑 
摘 要  
本文旨在分析檢討信託之結構，並以臺灣、日本，以及南韓之信
託法為探討對象。臺灣、日本，以及南韓私法體系，係奠基於羅馬日
耳曼（Roman Germanic）法律體系上。因此有關財產法體系，係採
二足鼎立之架構，即債權法與物權法。然在此體系下引進信託法，卻
有造成與既有私法體系及架構不容之結果。雖仍具爭議性，將信託視
為契約之一種，就以前述東亞歐陸法區域而言，殆屬多數見解。反之，
當今英美法體系之多數見解，將信託視為物權法之子領域。在前揭東
亞歐陸法體系中，亦有學者受英美法之影響，主張信託具有物權法之
性質。應注意者係，除此兩種看法之外，另有第三種態度；此態度視
信託為一種特別財產的創設行為，而兼具歐陸法以及英美法成分的混
合法體系地區之信託法，皆採納此結構。前述東亞歐陸法體系之信託
法，可謂處於一個交叉的十字路口，蓋有關其正確態度，尚未有任何
定論：處於「尚未定論」之一條路口上，觀看其他三條路口。歐陸私
法體系重視為概念命名其性質，蓋此為法律分類學之實行基礎，故其
重要性，絕不可小覷。吾人應自此十字路口走出，並邁向新的路口：
撰寫本文之目的，亦在於此。 
 
關鍵詞： 信託、契約、物權、特別財產、意思表示、所有權、嫁妝
（羅馬法）、奴隸財產（羅馬法） 
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